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Wednesday March 29th, 2023

Sri Lanka budget revenues surge 38-pct to Sept 22 as economy inflates

ECON0MYNEXT – Sri Lanka state revenues surged 38 percent from a year earlier to 1,448 billion rupees in the eight months to September 2022, Finance Ministry data showed as the economy inflated in the wake of a currency collapse after two years of money printing.

Tax revenues surged 35 percent to 1,283 billion rupees amid tax hikes and high inflation even as the real economy contracted as attempts were made to stop the currency crisis, in familiar repeated phenomenon seen in countries with soft-pegged central banks.

The government has also hiked taxes, bringing in more revenue.

As a share of GDP tax revenues were still at 5.4 percent down from 5.7 percent as the economy was estimated to inflate to at least 23.8 trillion rupees in 2022 from 16.8 trillion rupees.

Current spending rose 20 percent from a year earlier to 1,571 billion rupees driven mainly by rising interest costs.

Soft-Pegging

High and volatile interest costs are also a familiar feature of countries with soft-pegged (intermediate regime) central banks which generate monetary instability.

Interest costs rose to 927.4 billion rupees from 833.0 billion rupees as breaks were put on the currency crisis amid a deficit.

Current spending was down to 6.1 percent of GDP from 6.3 percent a year earlier as the economy inflated, a phenomenon where budget and debt become manageable as debt is inflated away known as high inflation and financial repression.

Sri Lanka’s inflation hit 70 percent in the third quarter but interest rates were only around 30 percent.

Classical economists and analysts have called for a currency board to be set up so that money cannot be printed by interventionists (post-Keynesians or Mercantilists) to create currency crises which are then followed by output shocks and high interest rates.

Sri Lanka saw heightened monetary instability in the wake of ‘flexible’ inflation targeting, perhaps the most deadly dual anchor conflicting soft-pegging regime ever peddled to hapless developing nations without a doctrinal foundation in sound money, according to critics.

The framework which helped drive a country at peace into default with surging ‘cover up loans’ as forex shortages made in difficult to repay foreign debt (a phenomenon known as the transfer problem) is to be legalized under a deal with the International Monetary Fund.

Policy makers in such countries – characterized by Latin America – have both ‘fear of floating’ and currency board phobia preventing the operation of a consistent single anchor monetary regime with low interest rates and external stability.

Such countries have long term low growth as about 18 months in a four year credit cycle is spent recovering from the previous currency crisis from ‘flexible’ and ‘data driven’ policy.

The lags in inflation allowed Sri Lanka central bank to suppress rates with money printing and bombard the exchange rate peg until it collapses, creating currency crises in 2015/16, 2018 and in 2020/2022.

Deficits down

The current account or revenue deficit of the budget, or the gap between total revenues and current spending was 851.7 billion rupees, down 18 percent from 1,036 billion rupees.

As share of GDP the current account deficit was down to 3.6 percent of GDP from 6.2 percent.

Capital spending was up 35 percent to 395.6 billion rupees up to September. However as a share of GDP it remained at 1.7 percent as the economy inflated.

The overall deficit was 1,244 billion rupees down 6 percent from a year earlier. As a share of the inflated economy, the deficit was down to 5.2 percent from 7.9 percent a year earlier.

The primary deficit, which is the deficit before interest costs fell to 317.06 billion rupees up to September down from 495.25 a year earlier.

The IMF usually targets a primary deficit because interest costs tend to rise as a currency crisis triggered by the soft-pegged central bank is halted.

Up to September 2022, 1,217 billion rupees were printed (classified as central bank credit to government), up from 665.5 billion rupees last year, compared to a deficit of only 1,244 billion rupees.

It is as if no private sector or EPF money was used to finance the deficit.

Critics have said that Sri Lanka’s central bank usually monetizes not the annual deficit, but the gross domestic finance requirement (maturing bills from past deficits) due to an obsession with controlling Treasuries yields, and the action is then blamed on the ‘budget deficit’.

In 2022 Sri Lanka’s central bank repaid state foreign loans, and also sterilized interventions after using deferred payments on Asian Clearing Union dues from India.

Offsetting reserves sold for imports is effectively private sector financing, but due to the use of Treasury bills for the activity, the practice is also blamed on ‘budget deficits’.

(Colombo/Nov18/2022 – Corrected – data to September not August 2022)

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Sri Lanka stocks weaken for the second session on profit taking

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka’s stocks closed weaker on Tuesday for the second consecutive session mainly driven by month-end profit-taking by investors, according to brokers.

The main All Share Price Index (ASPI) closed down 0.56 percent or 51.81 points to 9,233.40.

The market has been on a downward trend since last week as investors are adopting a wait-and-see approach until more clarity is given regarding local debt restructuring after the International Monetary Fund approved the extended loan facility.

“The market is down as the selling trend continues,” said Ranjan Ranatunga of First Capital Holdings, speaking to EconomyNext.

“As there is a price decline in all shares across the board, combined with the month ending followed by margin calls, the market continued on a downward trend.”

The market generated a slow and thin turnover of 860 million rupees.

The main contributor to the turnover is Lanka IOC, following news that the Sri Lanka cabinet has granted approval for three oil companies from China, the United States, and Australia in collaboration with Shell Pl to lease 150 fuel stations for each company to operate in the local market.

The fears of debt restructuring mainly affected the banking and financial sectors, which dragged the index down for the day.

The market saw a net foreign inflow of 30.9 million rupees, and the total offshore inflows recorded so far in 2023 are 1.01 billion rupees.

The most liquid index, S&P SL20, closed 0.81 percent or 21.68 points down at 2,656.30.

The market saw a turnover of 860 million on Tuesday, below this year’s daily average of 1.8 billion rupees.

Top losers were Vallibel One, John Keells Holdings, and Hatton National Bank.

Analysts said the downward trend is expected to continue for the rest of the week as profit-taking is expected to continue. (Colombo/March28/2023)

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Sri Lanka rupee closes weaker at 325/328 to dollar, bond yields up

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka’s treasury bond yields were up at close on Tuesday and the rupee closed weaker in the spot market, dealers said.

A 01.07.2025 bond was quoted at 31.20/60 percent on Tuesday, up from 30.75/31.00 percent on Monday.

A 15.09.2027 bond was quoted at 28.25/29.00 percent, up from 28.10/60 percent from Monday.

Sri Lanka rupee opened at 325/328 against the US dollar steady, from 322/325 from a day earlier. (Colombo/ March28/2023)

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Sri Lanka Telecom on track rating upgrade track on planned stake sale: Fitch

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka Telecom has been place on watch for a possible rating upgrade after the government, which has defaulted on its sovereign debt said it will sell down its majority stake.

“The rating reflects the potential rating upside due to weakening linkages with SLT’s parent, the government of Sri Lanka (Long-Term Local-Currency Issuer Default Rating: CC), due to the government’s plan to sell its 49.5 percent stake in the company,” the rating agency said.

“Fitch will resolve the RWP when the proposed disposal becomes practically unconditional, which
may take more than six months.”

The agency said it expect SLT’s revenue growth to slow to a low single-digit percentage in 2023 amid weakening consumer spending due to consumers increasingly prioritising essential needs, such as food and medicine, as real income has fallen significantly following the currency depreciation and unprecedently high inflation.

The full statement is reproduced below;

Fitch Places Sri Lanka Telecom’s ‘A(lka)’ Rating on Watch Positive

Fitch Ratings – Colombo – 27 Mar 2023: Fitch Ratings has placed Sri Lanka Telecom PLC’s (SLT) National Long-Term Rating of ‘A(lka)’ on Rating Watch Positive (RWP).

The RWP reflects the potential rating upside due to weakening linkages with SLT’s parent, the government of Sri Lanka (Long-Term Local-Currency Issuer Default Rating: CC), due to the government’s plan to sell its 49.5% stake in the company. Fitch will resolve the RWP when the proposed disposal becomes practically unconditional, which may take more than six months.

SLT’s ratings are currently constrained by its parent’s weak credit profile under Fitch’s Parent and Subsidiary Linkage (PSL) Rating Criteria. SLT’s Standalone Credit Profile (SCP) is stronger than that of the state, reflecting the company’s market leadership in fixed-line services, second-largest share in mobile, ownership of an extensive optical fibre network and a strong financial profile. The extent of SLT’s rating upside, following the proposed disposal, will depend on the credit profile of its new parent, the linkage strength with SLT according to our PSL criteria, and the proposed funding structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Disposal Plan: SLT announced on 20 March 2023 that the Sri Lankan cabinet has granted in-principle approval to sell the 49.5% stake in SLT held by the state. The disposal is part of a plan to restructure state-owned entities (SOEs) to improve the state’s financial position. SLT said steps have yet to be taken to identify potential buyers and it will take at least eight to 12 months to finalise the transaction. We believe the government will push through the disposal as SOE restructuring is an integral part of the IMF’s financial support to Sri Lanka.

Sovereign Ownership Pressures Rating: We assess the legal ring-fencing and access and control between SLT and the state as ‘Open’ under the PSL criteria, given the absence of regulatory or self-imposed ring-fencing of SLT’s cash flow and the government’s significant influence over the subsidiary’s operating and financial profile. SLT’s second- biggest shareholder, Malaysia-based Usaha Tegas Sdn Bhd with a 44.9% stake, has no special provisions in its shareholder agreement to dilute the government’s influence over SLT.

Higher Rating: However, the PSL criteria allows for a stronger subsidiary to be notched above the weaker parent’s consolidated profile in extreme situations, such as when a parent is in financial distress but the subsidiary continues to operate independently and its banking access appears unaffected. We do not believe SLT is at risk of default in the next 12 months, as it has sufficient liquidity and its debt does not carry cross-default clauses that can be triggered by the parent’s distress.

SLT’s ‘A(lka)’ rating therefore reflects its relativities with national peers, but is still below its SCP due to the drag from state ownership. We apply our PSL criteria because our Government-Related Entities (GRE) Rating Criteria states that in cases where the SCP of the GRE is higher than the government’s IDR, the relevant considerations of the PSL criteria will be applied to determine whether the IDR of the GRE is constrained or capped at the government’s rating level.

Weak Demand in 2023: We expect SLT’s revenue growth to slow to a low single-digit percentage in 2023 amid weakening consumer spending. Consumers are increasingly prioritising essential needs, such as food and medicine, as real income has fallen significantly following the currency depreciation and unprecedently high inflation. SLT’s subscriber numbers and minutes of usage have already fallen in 2022. Competition has also intensified, especially in the mobile segment, leading to lower realisation of recently introduced tariff hikes.

Weak demand should be offset to an extent by increased migration to SLT’s fibre-to-the- home (FTTH) network, from its own copper network, and subscriber additions. FTTH carries higher revenue per user than the copper network. SLT had 475,000 FTTH connections, a 35% increase yoy, by end-2022.

Weakening Profitability: We expect SLT’s EBITDA margin to narrow to around 34% in 2023 (2022: 35.6%) amid lower demand and ongoing cost escalations. All telecom operators increased tariffs by 20%-25% in late 2022 to tackle falling margins. However, the realisation into revenue remains weak, especially in the mobile segment, due to deep price cuts by one of the smaller operators and falling demand. SLT’s fixed-line business is able to maintain stable EBITDA margins due to the recent tariff hike and the FTTH segment’s higher revenue per user.

Leverage to Stabilise: We expect SLT’s EBITDA net leverage to remain around 1.3x in 2023 (2021: 0.9x, 2022: 1.3x) amid falling profitability. However, its leverage is strong for the rating. We expect capex of around LKR25.0 billion annually over 2023-2024 on network upgrades and expanding its fibre infrastructure.

Interest-Rate Hikes, Currency Depreciation Manageable: We expect SLT to maintain its EBITDA interest coverage closer to 4.0x over 2023-2024 (2022: 4.4x) despite interest rates rising almost threefold. Most of SLT’s debt is on variable interest rates, which will raise costs. SLT’s foreign-currency revenue, which accounts for 10%-12% of group revenue, is more than sufficient to meet the group’s foreign-currency operating expenses and interest costs. SLT had around USD10 million in foreign-currency debt at end-
December 2022, compared with USD40 million in foreign-currency cash deposits.

Sector Outlook Deteriorating: Fitch expects the average 2023 net debt/EBITDA ratio for SLT and mobile leader Dialog Axiata PLC (AAA(lka)/Stable) to remain around 1.3x (2022: 1.3x) amid weak margins and high capex. We expect sector revenue growth to slow to 8% in 2023 (2022: 15%), while the average 2023 EBITDA margin for SLT and Dialog should narrow to 31% (2022: 32%) amid low usage and high costs.

DERIVATION SUMMARY
SLT’s SCP benefits from market leadership in fixed-line services and the second-largest position in mobile, along with ownership of an extensive optical fibre network. SLT has lower exposure to the crowded mobile market and has more diverse service platforms than Dialog. However, Dialog has a larger revenue base, lower forecast EBITDA net leverage and a better free cash flow (FCF) profile than SLT. Dialog is rated at ‘AAA(lka)’, while SLT’s rating is under pressure because of the state’s weak credit profile.

SLT has a larger operating scale than leading alcoholic-beverage manufacturer Melstacorp PLC (AAA(lka)/Stable), which distributes spirits in Sri Lanka through its subsidiary, Distilleries Company of Sri Lanka PLC (AAA(lka)/Stable). Melstacorp is exposed to more regulatory risk in its spirits business because of increases in the excise tax, but this is counterbalanced by its entrenched market position and high entry barriers.

Consequently, the company can pass on cost inflation and maintain its operating EBITDA margin, supporting substantially stronger FCF generation than SLT.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch’s Key Assumptions within Our Rating Case for the Issuer:

– Revenue growth to slow to 4% in 2023 amid falling subscriber numbers and lower usage due to weakening consumer spending;

– Operating EBITDA margin to narrow by 150bp to 34% in 2023 due to higher costs and lower volume;

– SLT to continue capex on expanding its fibre and 4G network with LKR25 billion spent annually in 2023 and 2024;

– Effective tax rate of 28% from 2023;

– Dividend payout of 33% of net income over 2024-2025

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive rating action/upgrade:

– Fitch will resolve the RWP when the proposed disposal becomes practically unconditional, which may take more than six months, and once Fitch has sufficient information on the new majority shareholder’s credit profile and linkages with SLT and the proposed funding structure.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative rating action/downgrade:

– Fitch would remove the RWP and affirm the National Long-Term Rating at ‘A(lka)’ with a Stable Outlook if the proposed disposal does not proceed and the linkages with the state remain intact.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Manageable Liquidity: SLT’s unrestricted cash balance of LKR14 billion at end- December 2022 was sufficient to redeem its contractual maturities of around LKR11 billion. SLT’s short-term working-capital debt amounted to another LKR10.0 billion and we expect the company to roll over the facilities given its solid access to local banks.

Liquidity is further enhanced by about LKR15 billion in undrawn bank credit facilities, although these are uncommitted. SLT typically does not pay commitment fees on its undrawn lines, although we believe most banks will allow the company to draw down the funds because of its healthy credit profile.

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