An Echelon Media Company
Tuesday November 10th, 2026

Sri Lanka RD rating confirmed by Fitch, says EDR could be delayed

ECONOMYNEXT – Fitch Ratings has confirmed a ‘restricted default’ (RD) rating of Sri Lanka after its sovereign default and said policy uncertainty after a election

“Sri Lanka’s September 2024 Presidential election was won by one of the opposition leaders,” Fitch said.

“Fitch believes the result add uncertainty to the country’s policy direction and could lead to a delay in the completion of the foreign-currency debt restructuring or renegotiation of the IMF programme.

“The upcoming 2025 budget, to be adopted by November 2024, could offer clarity on the new government’s policies.”

Recent deals with bondholders and China Development Bank shows that progress is being made, the rating agency said.

The full statement is reproduced below:

Fitch Affirms Sri Lanka at ‘RD’

Fitch Ratings – Hong Kong – 25 Sep 2024: Fitch Ratings has affirmed Sri Lanka’s Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at ‘RD’ (Restricted Default) and Long-Term Local-Currency IDR at ‘CCC-‘. Fitch typically does not assign Outlooks to issuers with a rating of ‘CCC+’ or below.

A full list of rating actions is at the end of this rating action commentary.

Key Rating Drivers

Restructuring Negotiations Ongoing: The sovereign remains in default on its foreign-currency obligations, while restructuring negotiations are ongoing with Sri Lanka’s private external creditors. The authorities’ recent announcement that a preliminary debt restructuring agreement has been reached, in principle, with members of the steering committee of the Ad Hoc Group of Bondholders (representing foreign holders of Sri Lanka’s international sovereign bonds) and China Development Bank (A+/Negative) suggests progress is being made.

The agreement comes after the 12 April 2022 announcement suspending debt servicing on several categories of external debt, including bonds issued in international capital markets, foreign currency-denominated loans and credit facilities with commercial banks and institutional lenders. The Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR has been on ‘RD’ since May 2022, once the grace period expired.

Policy Uncertainty Following Elections: Sri Lanka’s September 2024 Presidential election was won by one of the opposition leaders. Fitch believes the result add uncertainty to the country’s policy direction and could lead to a delay in the completion of the foreign-currency debt restructuring or renegotiation of the IMF programme. The upcoming 2025 budget, to be adopted by November 2024, could offer clarity on the new government’s policies.

Local-Currency Debt Exchange Complete: Sri Lanka completed the local-currency portion of its domestic debt optimisation in September 2023. This followed the exchange of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka’s treasury bills and provisional advance into new treasury bonds and bills. This led us to upgrade the Local-Currency IDR to ‘CCC-‘. The rating is being affirmed at this level.

Government Debt to Stay High: The IMF forecasts Sri Lanka’s gross general government debt/GDP ratio to decline only gradually to about 103% of GDP by 2028, from about 116% in 2022. This forecast incorporates a local- and foreign-currency debt restructuring scenario. However, this level of debt would still be elevated, even after the restructuring.

External Metrics Improving: Foreign-currency (FX) reserves have been improving, with gross FX reserves reaching around USD6.0 billion in August 2024, against USD4.4 billion at end-2023, partly due to the suspension of external debt service. Other supporting factors include an uptick in tourism and overseas worker remittances. The current account was in a surplus in 2023 and we expect a surplus in 2024. The sovereign, however, remains dependent on official financing sources without access to international capital markets.

Stronger Revenue Generation: Weak IMF program implementation, in particular of fiscal measures, remains a risk to achieving debt sustainability. Sri Lanka has a weak longer-term revenue raising record, but the authorities have implemented several major tax measures since May 2022 to boost revenue collection and achieve debt sustainability. These included raising the corporate income tax rate, hikes to the value-added tax rate and raising fuel excise taxes. This saw revenue collection improve by 42% yoy in 1H24.

Additional fiscal measures in the pipeline include an increase in the corporate income tax to 45%, from 40%, for certain types of economic activity, an additional value-added tax rate on the supply of digital services, further tax administration reforms as well as limiting tax exemptions and making them more transparent.

Economy on a Recovering Trend: We expect economic growth to recover to 3.9% in 2024 and average at 3.6% over 2025-2026. Real GDP growth, in seasonally adjusted terms, recovered to about 5.0% yoy in 1H24 after contracting by 7.0% during 1H23, driven by a pick-up in industrial growth to 11.3% after a contraction of about 18.0% in 1H23. Services also recovered by about 2.7% during the same period after a contraction in 1H23.

Inflation in Check: We expect further easing of monetary policy over 2024-2026, after the Central Bank of Sri Lanka reduced the standing deposit facility rate by a cumulative 725bp since June 2023, as underlying inflationary pressure remains muted. Inflation was about 0.6% in August 2024, in seasonally adjusted terms, and has been in the single digits for over a year. A surge in inflation, peaking in September 2022 at around 67%, was successfully curtailed by the central bank.

Banking Sector Stabilising: The banking sector’s non-performing loans remain high, partly owing to the economic stress associated with the sovereign default. However, the domestic bank operating environment continues to show signs of stabilisation, in line with improved economic indicators. This supports the recovery in banks’ operational flexibility. The completion of the local-currency portion of Sri Lanka’s domestic debt optimisation was a major step towards reducing the impact of the sovereign’s debt restructuring on the banking sector.

ESG – Governance: Sri Lanka has an ESG Relevance Score of ‘5’ for Political Stability and Rights as well as for the Rule of Law, Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption. These scores reflect the high weight that the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) have in our proprietary Sovereign Rating Model (SRM). Sri Lanka has a medium WBGI ranking in the 36th percentile, reflecting a recent record of peaceful political transitions, a moderate level of rights for participation in the political process, moderate institutional capacity, established rule of law and a moderate level of corruption.

ESG – Creditor Rights: Sri Lanka has an ESG Relevance Score of ‘5’ for Creditor Rights, as willingness to service and repay debt is highly relevant to the rating and is a key rating driver with a high weight. The affirmation of Sri Lanka’s Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at ‘RD’ reflects a default event.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative Rating Action/Downgrade

External Finances: The Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR is at the lowest level and cannot be downgraded.

Public Finances: The Local-Currency IDR would be downgraded if further restructuring or a default on local-currency debt becomes probable due to an unsustainable debt burden or inability to raise revenue.
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive Rating Action/Upgrade

External Finances: Completion of the foreign-currency commercial debt restructuring that Fitch judges to have normalised the relationship with private-sector creditors would result in an upgrade of the Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR.

Public Finances: A sustained decline in the general government debt/GDP ratio that is underpinned by the implementation of a medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy and faster economic growth.
Sovereign Rating Model (SRM) and Qualitative Overlay (QO)

Fitch’s proprietary SRM assigns Sri Lanka a score equivalent to a rating of ‘CCC+’ on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR scale. In accordance with the rating criteria for ratings in the ‘CCC’ range and below, Fitch has not used the SRM or QO to explain the ratings, which are instead guided by Fitch’s rating definitions.

Fitch’s SRM is the agency’s proprietary multiple regression rating model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score equivalent to a Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR. Fitch’s QO is a forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within our criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected in the SRM.
Country Ceiling

Sri Lanka’s Country Ceiling is ‘B-‘. For sovereigns rated ‘CCC+’ or below, Fitch assumes a starting point of ‘CCC+’ to determine the Country Ceiling.

Fitch’s Country Ceiling Model produced a starting point uplift of zero notches. Fitch applied a +1 notch qualitative adjustment under the balance of payments restrictions pillar, reflecting that the private sector has not been prevented or significantly impeded from converting local currency into foreign currency and transferring the proceeds to non-resident creditors to service debt payments. Fitch does not assign Country Ceilings below ‘CCC+’, and only assigns a Country Ceiling of ‘CCC+’ in the event that transfer and convertibility risk has materialised and is affecting the majority of economic sectors and asset classes.
REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are described in the Applicable Criteria.
ESG Considerations

Sri Lanka has an ESG Relevance Score of ‘5’ for Political Stability and Rights, as WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch’s SRM and are highly relevant to the rating and a key rating driver with a high weight. As Sri Lanka has a percentile rank below 50 for the respective governance indicator, this has a negative impact on the credit profile.

Sri Lanka has an ESG Relevance Score of ‘5’ for Rule of Law, Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption, as WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch’s SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and are a key rating driver with a high weight. As Sri Lanka has a percentile rank below 50 for the respective governance indicator, this has a negative impact on the credit profile.

Sri Lanka has an ESG Relevance Score of ‘4’ for Human Rights and Political Freedoms, as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the WBGIs is relevant to the rating and a rating driver. As Sri Lanka has a percentile rank below 50 for the respective governance indicator, this has a negative impact on the credit profile.

Sri Lanka has an ESG Relevance Score of ‘5’ for Creditor Rights, as willingness to service and repay debt is highly relevant to the rating and is a key rating driver with a high weight. Sri Lanka’s Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR is at ‘RD’, as the sovereign is in default on its foreign-currency debt obligations.

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of ‘3’, unless otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of ‘3’ means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by the entity. Fitch’s ESG Relevance Scores are not inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision. For more information on Fitch’s ESG Relevance Scores, visit www.fitchratings.com/topics/esg/products#esg-relevance-scores

Sri Lanka’s flash floods in capital point to systemic institutional failure, ignored directives

ECONOMYNEXT – As torrential monsoon downpours transformed Sri Lanka’s commercial capital’s thoroughfares into raging brown rivers on Friday (06) submerging vehicles, paralyzing public transit, and inundating critical facilities like the National Hospital, the crisis was framed by authorities as an act of nature.

But for the millions of residents wading through waist-deep water, the disaster was not merely meteorological. It was man-made, preventable, and a glaring testament to gross institutional negligence.

Vraîe Cally Balthazaar, the Mayor of the island nation’s biggest local governing body Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) posted on her FaceBook (Meta) platform just a week ago before the floods that people in her ward “have had to live with the risk of flooding for years” after the stormwater drain running through the Jawatta Public Cemetery collapsed in 2019.

She said in the post that she promised the residents that the CMC would get the repairs done before the end of September, and she was happy to say that the CMC has “managed to complete the work by September 15.

“And sometimes, something as simple as fixing a drain can make a real difference to an entire neighbourhood,” Balthazaar said.

However, the flash floods saw the same area heavily flooded despite the ‘fixing’ by the CMC.

Just 24 days before the floods, Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya herself issued a direct, unequivocal order to government officials and municipal authorities to treat the cleaning of Colombo’s canal and drainage systems as an exceptional priority.

She directed to expedite the work and complete it within two weeks to ensure proper rainwater management amid anticipated increases in rainfall.

Prime Minister Amarasuriya issued these directives while addressing the Colombo District Coordinating Committee meeting held on October 13 at the Narahenpita District Secretariat.

During the meeting, officials from divisional secretariat offices, the Agrarian Development Department, and the Provincial Irrigation Department highlighted existing challenges in cleaning drainage and canal systems, noting issues such as a shortage of technical officers and difficulties faced in formulating plans and estimates.

Her instruction came in response to early meteorological indicators pointing toward an intensifying inter-monsoonal rainfall season.

But the floods last week proved that these directives had been ignored, delayed, and left unimplemented by the very bodies sworn to protect the city’s populace.

Recognizing the chronic vulnerability of the commercial capital’s low-lying geography, the Prime Minister instructed relevant stakeholders to systematically clear Colombo’s primary canals, secondary outlets, and subterranean drainage systems.

Crucially, the directive came with a strict deadline: a two-week window to complete the comprehensive clearing of blockages, silt, and solid waste that choke the city’s waterways.

Colombo would not have had last week’s floods, had the Prime Minister’s instruction been heeded and executed.

But the Prime Minister’s instruction designed precisely to preempt the catastrophic urban flooding that has chronically plagued Colombo during heavy weather was ignored.

Yet, when the skies opened up last Friday (06), the two-week deadline had long expired into the ether of bureaucratic inaction.

The canals remained congested with plastic debris, unauthorized construction bottlenecks, and thick layers of silt.

The drainage systems, starved of maintenance, failed instantly.

Neither the central government machinery nor the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) can wash their hands of accountability.

The ‘Clean Sri Lanka’ programme under the current government has been created to deal with prevention of flooding among many other ambitious goals.

“The responsibility for this damage must be borne by the President even more than the Mayor,” former Urban Development and Megapolis Minister Champika Ranawaka, a strong government critic, said on his YouTube platform.

“He is the head of the disaster management apparatus, and ‘Clean Sri Lanka’ operates under his direct leadership. Because of his actions and their administrative conduct, the entire state machinery has been brought to a standstill.”

Anatomy of Municipal Paralysis

When orders from the higher office like Prime Minister of the state can be casually sidelined by municipal inertia, it exposes a profound fracture in governance, one where public safety is compromised by institutional paralysis.

At the heart of Colombo’s drainage crisis is a systemic failure of local governance and inter-agency coordination.

The Colombo Municipal Council, tasked with the day-to-day stewardship of municipal infrastructure, waste management, and local drainage networks, has long operated in an administrative comfort zone characterized by reactive posturing rather than proactive mitigation.

When the Prime Minister’s directive was issued in mid-October, it should have triggered an immediate emergency mobilization.

Municipal work crews, heavy machinery, and desilting operations ought to have been deployed across every vulnerable ward, from the commercial hubs of Fort and Pettah to densely populated residential quarters like Borella, Wellawatte, and Grandpass.

Instead, citizens witnessed what can only be described as administrative inertia.

Bureaucratic red tape, sluggish procurement of maintenance contracts, and a lack of accountability mechanisms meant that instructions from the Prime Minister trickled down into endless committee meetings rather than field operations.

By treating a critical pre-monsoon cleanup as a routine administrative task rather than an urgent, life-saving imperative, municipal officials displayed a reckless disregard for urban risk management.

The government repeatedly said it has collected ample tax revenue to run the country. But that money could not be used urgently to protect the Colombo city when it was evident what was going to happen as per Prime Minister Amarasuriya’s instructions.

Furthermore, the failure extends beyond mere delayed cleanups to encompass chronic structural enforcement failures.

Over decades, Colombo’s natural hydrological buffers including its wetlands, marshes, and secondary flood retention areas have been systematically degraded or encroached upon by uncoordinated commercial and residential developments.

When drainage systems are clogged with garbage while vital retention pathways are blocked by concrete, even a standard heavy downpour is bound to trigger catastrophe.

Friday’s deluge merely exposed the cumulative cost of this willful administrative blindness.

Economic Toll of Negligence

The consequences of this systemic failure were borne immediately by ordinary citizens and critical public infrastructure.

The inundation of the National Hospital of Sri Lanka, where floodwaters unprecedentedly breached critical service areas, should be considered a national scandal.

That a premier healthcare institution can be crippled within 2 hours of heavy rain, jeopardizing patient care and compromising sterile environments, illustrates the deadly stakes of municipal failure.

Beyond the hospitals, small business owners watched their livelihoods float away, commuters were stranded for hours in gridlocked, submerged buses, and low-income families residing in underserved settlements suffered extensive property damage.

For an urban economy trying to anchor Sri Lanka’s fragile post-crisis recovery, recurring paralyzing floods exact a heavy toll in lost productivity, infrastructure damage, and emergency response costs.

Accountability

The CMC and government have pointed fingers at the illegal structures erected under past governments for the latest disaster. But this government has already been in power for two years.

In the aftermath of the disaster, routine finger-pointing between central agencies and municipal bodies also has begun, with officials attempting to deflect blame onto unprecedented rainfall volumes.

But meteorological data offers no refuge for negligent administrators.

The rainfall, while heavy, was seasonally anticipated; indeed, it was precisely why the Prime Minister issued her October directive.

When a directive issued by the second-in-command of the country is left gathering dust on a municipal desk while citizens face preventable devastation, the social contract breaks down.

The current government and the Colombo Municipal Council cannot hide behind excuses of resource constraints or administrative oversight.

Preventing flash floods requires more than issuing seasonal press releases or convening post-disaster committees after the water has receded.

It demands rigorous enforcement, transparent institutional accountability, and a zero-tolerance approach to administrative lethargy.

If the authorities cannot execute basic drainage maintenance, Colombo will remain structurally vulnerable, hostage to the next raincloud, and failed by the very institutions meant to protect it. (Colombo/November 08/2026)

Continue Reading

Sri Lanka rupee closes at 332.53/59 to US dollar spot, bond yields edge up

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka’s rupee closed at 332.53/59 to the US dollar spot on Monday, from 332.55/60 the previous day, while bond yields closed higher, dealers said.

A bond maturing on 15.09.2029 closed at 190/98 percent, up from 10.85/95 percent.

A bond maturing on 01.08.2030 closed at 11.07/12 percent, up from 11.05/10 percent.

A bond maturing on 01.02.2031 closed at 11.30/40 percent, up from 11.10/15 percent.

A bond maturing on 15.12.2032 closed at 11.65/70 percent, up from 11.55/65 percent.

A bond maturing on 01.11.2033 closed at 11.95/12.00 percent, up from 11.90/95 percent.

A bond maturing on 15.10.2034 closed at 12.10/15 percent, up from 12.05/12 percent.

A bond maturing on 15.08.2036 closed at 12.40/50 percent, up from 12.30/40 percent. (Colombo/Nov9/2026)

Continue Reading

Sri Lanka stocks close up 1.37-pct, banks lead turnover

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka’s Colombo Stock Exchange closed up on Monday, CSE data showed, with the benchmark All Share Price Index moving up 1.37 percent.

The ASPI was up 291.72 points at 21,531.37, while the more liquid S&P SL20 was up 1.67 percent, or 100.96 points, at 6,146.34.

Positive contributors to the ASPI were Commercial Bank of Ceylon (up 2.86 percent at 216.00 rupees), Hatton National Bank (up 1.52 percent at 399.75 rupees), Asiri Hospital Holdings (up 12.86 percent at 31.60 rupees), Tokyo Cement Company (up 5.22 percent at 84.70 rupees), and Access Engineering (up 3.93 percent at 81.90 rupees).

Carson Cumberbatch (down 4.24 percent at 712.00 rupees), Richard Pieris and Company (down 2.43 percent at 28.10 rupees), LOLC Holdings (down 0.62 percent at 400.00 rupees), Renuka Holdings (down 2.63 percent at 37.00 rupees), and Chevron Lubricants Lanka (down 0.61 percent at 204.25 rupees) were top negative contributors.

Market turnover was 3.33 billion rupees. The S&P/CSE Banks Industry Group led turnover with 667.76 million rupees.

The session saw heavy crossings, according to Raynal Wickremeratne, Head of Research and Strategy at NDB Securities. Significant crossings included Keells (23 million rupees), Distilleries Company (27.7 million rupees), Sunshine Holdings (30.6 million rupees), Commercial Bank (32.4 million rupees), Ceylon Tobacco Company (35.6 million rupees), Hatton National Bank (39.5 million rupees), Prime Lands (40.5 million rupees), and HAS Holdings (41.5 million rupees).

In corporate news, Hayleys Retail Holdings Ltd announced it has partnered with supply chain software provider Blue Yonder to build and scale an AI-native grocery supermarket chain across Sri Lanka. (Colombo/Nov09/2026)

 

Continue Reading

Sri Lanka’s Hayleys Retail to launch supermarket chain with Blue Yonder

ECONOMYNEXT — Hayleys Retail Holdings Ltd has selected supply chain software provider Blue Yonder to build its grocery retail operations from the ground up, the two companies said in a joint statement.

Hayleys Retail, a member of Sri Lanka’s diversified conglomerate Hayleys Group, plans to open several stores across the country. The agreement marks Blue Yonder’s first retail customer in Sri Lanka.

“Our entry into supermarket retail is about bringing that same commitment to quality and reliability closer to everyday Sri Lankan consumers,” Mohan Pandithage, Chairman and Chief Executive of Hayleys PLC said.

“With Blue Yonder, our teams will have AI-driven insight to deliver a seamless, consistent shopping experience across every store,” he said.

Hayleys, which accounts for approximately 5 percent of Sri Lanka’s export income and operates across 17 business sectors, is entering the large-scale supermarket space by drawing on its group strengths in manufacturing, logistics, and services.

The company selected Blue Yonder to connect its data across merchandising and shelf space, deploy artificial intelligence agents to catch operational issues early, and scale its business into a national network without changing platforms.

The rollout will begin with merchandise operations to manage suppliers, items, costs, and pricing, followed by machine learning capabilities to forecast demand and balance store inventory during seasonal peaks.

“Hayleys Retail is choosing one where AI is the foundation rather than an add-on—connected data and agentic AI built into core merchandising operations, and planning that learns as the business grows,” Antonio Boccalandro, President, APAC at Blue Yonder said.

The retailer plans to use the platform to automate routine store tasks and adjust inventory according to real-time sales and local market trends as its store footprint grows. (Colombo/Nov09/2026)

 

Continue Reading

Sri Lanka’s Citrus Leisure extends Lotus Tower management pact

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka listed hospitality firm Citrus Leisure said it has extended an agreement to manage consumer-facing and entertainment spaces at the Colombo Lotus Tower, which includes revolving restaurant Blue Orbit, until June next year.

The initial agreement signed between Citrus Leisure and Colombo Lotus Tower Management Company (Private) Limited (CLTMC) is due to expire on December 11.

“The Board of Directors of CLTMC at meeting held on 2nd November 2026 has resolved to extend the term of the Management Agreement and continue the existing Management Agreement until 30th June 2027, to which the company has given its concurrence,” the company said in a market filing.

Citrus Leisure Plc opened its revolving restaurant at the Lotus Tower in December 2023.

The company signed a 3-year agreement with CLTMC in May 2023 to provide services in the management of (l) the banquet hall 1 on the 25th floor, (2) the banquet hall 2 on the 26th floor, (3) the revolving restaurant on the 27th floor, (4) the 6 suites situated on the 28th floor and the kitchen in the basement floor of the Colombo Lotus Tower.

The 350-meter or 1,150-feet tower, the tallest in South Asia, was built at a cost 104.3 million US dollars with 80 percent of the money borrowed from Exim Bank of China.

Located in the commercial heart of Colombo, the tower has been called a symbolic landmark of Sri Lanka as well as a colossal white elephant and has been mired in controversy for years. (Colombo/Nov9/2026)

Continue Reading

CIC Holdings Sept quarter net profit rises 20-pct to Rs1.7bn

ECONOMYNEXT — Sri Lanka conglomerate CIC Holdings recorded a net profit of 1.66 billion rupees for the quarter ended September 30, rising 20.3 percent from 1.38 billion rupees in the same quarter last year, interim accounts showed.

The group posted basic earnings per share of 0.87 rupees for the September quarter, up from 0.73 rupees a year earlier.

Quarterly revenue grew 3.4 percent to 20.89 billion rupees from 20.20 billion rupees, supported by broad-based growth across industrial solutions, livestock, and healthcare segments, which counterbalanced relative demand moderation in agricultural inputs.

Cost of sales rose 5.3 percent to 15.20 billion rupees, outpacing revenue growth and causing gross profit to contract marginally by 1.2 percent to 5.68 billion rupees.

Results from operating activities dropped 7.3 percent to 2.66 billion rupees from 2.87 billion rupees, impacted by higher operating overheads.

Selling expenses expanded 6.8 percent to 2.15 billion rupees, and general and administrative expenses climbed 5.8 percent to 1.07 billion rupees, while other operating income dropped 29.6 percent to 117.40 million rupees.

However, operating profits were cushioned by an impairment reversal on trade receivables of 85.83 million rupees, turning around from an impairment provision of 23.38 million rupees in the corresponding quarter last year.

Net finance costs climbed 35.4 percent to 712.25 million rupees from 526.01 million rupees.

The increase was driven by a 30.8 percent rise in finance expenses to 771.46 million rupees, primarily reflecting higher interest expenses on loans to finance elevated working capital and inventory requirements.

The quarter’s bottom line was strongly bolstered by CIC’s equity-accounted investment in John Keells Holdings PLC (JKH).

Share of profit from equity-accounted investees surged more than fourfold to 590.50 million rupees from 257.87 million rupees, driven by JKH’s strong profit expansion during the period.

The group also recognized a gain on bargain purchase of 55.59 million rupees during the quarter resulting from additional share purchases in JKH where the proportionate net asset value exceeded acquisition cost, compared to no such gain a year earlier.

With associate income gains offsetting operating margin contraction and higher borrowing costs, group pre-tax profit held virtually flat at 2.59 billion rupees, down 0.11 percent.

Income tax expense fell 29.4 percent to 606.24 million rupees from 858.71 million rupees, driving total group profit for the period up 14.1 percent to 1.98 billion rupees.

Total group assets stood at 108.58 billion rupees as of September 30, up from 99.75 billion rupees at the end of March 2026.

Group net asset value per share increased to 25.52 rupees from 22.10 rupees a year earlier.

CIC Holdings’ ordinary voting shares closed at 27.80 rupees at the end of September.(Colombo/Nov09/2026)

 

Continue Reading