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Fitch downgrades Sri Lanka Telecom to ‘B’ on sovereign downgrade

ECONOMYNEXT – Fitch Ratings said it has downgraded Sri Lanka Telecom PLC’s (SLT) Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to ‘B’ from ‘B+’ with the outlook remaining stable.

The rating agency in a statement also confirmed SLT’s National Long-Term Rating at ‘AAA(lka)’ with a Stable Outlook, and also confirmed the national rating at ‘AAA(lka)’ on its seven billion rupee debt programme.

The rating action follows Fitch’s downgrade of Sri Lanka’s Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs to ‘B’ from ‘B+’.

The full Fitch statement follows:

Fitch Ratings – Singapore,Colombo – 05 December 2018: Fitch Ratings has downgraded Sri Lanka Telecom PLC’s (SLT) Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to ‘B’ from ‘B+’. The Outlook is Stable.

The agency has affirmed SLT’s National Long-Term Rating at ‘AAA(lka)’ with a Stable Outlook.
We have also affirmed the national rating at ‘AAA(lka)’ on the LKR7 billion debt programme.

The rating action follows Fitch’s downgrade of Sri Lanka’s Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs to ‘B’ from ‘B+’ (see "Fitch Downgrades Sri Lanka to ‘B’; Outlook Stable," dated 4 December 2018 on www.fitchratings.com).

SLT’s IDRs are constrained by Sri Lanka’s IDRs as per Fitch’s Government-Related Entities Rating Criteria, as the state holds a majority stake in SLT directly and indirectly, and exercises significant influence on its operating and financial profile. SLT’s second-biggest shareholder, Malaysia’s Usaha Tegas Sdn Bhd at 44.9%, has no special provisions in its shareholder agreement to dilute the government’s significant influence over SLT.

SLT’s standalone credit profile, assessed by Fitch at ‘BB’, is stronger than that of its owner, reflecting the company’s market-leading position in fixed-line services and second-largest position in mobile, along with its ownership of an extensive optical-fibre network. The standalone profile is also underpinned by its mid-single-digit percentage growth prospects, moderate estimated 2018 FFO adjusted net leverage of 1.7x and stable operating EBITDAR margin.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong State Linkages: Fitch sees SLT’s status, ownership and control by the Sri Lankan sovereign as ‘Strong’. The state’s ownership gives it significant influence over operating and financial policies. We view the support record and expectations for the likelihood of state support for SLT as ‘Strong’, given its strategic importance in expanding the country’s fibre infrastructure. Historically, SLT has not required tangible financial support due to its healthy financial profile.

State’s Incentive to Support: Fitch sees the socio-political implications of a default by SLT as ‘Moderate’ due to the presence of three other privately owned telcos. However, it could affect the fixed-line market because SLT acts as a policy company to invest in fibre networks across the island to support the government’s vision of fibre-based internet for all households.
Fitch also sees the financial implications of a default as ‘Strong’, as a financial default by SLT may have an impact on the availability and cost of financing options for other government-related entities.

High Capex, Negative FCF: We expect SLT to have negative free cash flow (FCF) during 2019-2020 (estimated 2018 negative FCF of LK2 billion-3 billion) as cash flow from operations may be insufficent to fund large capex plans to expand the fibre infrastructure and 4G mobile networks. SLT’s 2019 capex is likely to remain high, at around 28%-30% of revenue, as it aims to complete its 4G population coverage to around 95% by end-2019.

We expect SLT to continue to invest in expanding fibre coverage as it aims to connect about 1 million homes by 2020-2021, from an existing 70,000 homes currently enable. Typically, SLT would need to lay fibre for at least 2 million homes to half of the households to be connected.
We expect SLT’s fibre investments to have low returns due to the country’s low broadband tariffs. Dividends are likely to remain around LKR1.6 billion-1.8 billion in the next two to three years.
Data Drives Growth: We expect revenue to grow by a mid-single-digit percentage during 2019-2020 (barring any tax shocks), driven by data and fixed-broadband growth. We expect 4G smartphone penetration to improve from the current 25% with the proliferation of cheaper Chinese phones. Revenue rose strongly by 6.5% in the first nine months of 2018, driven by fixedbroadband and mobile usage after a temporary usage slump in 2017 due to higher taxes on oice and data. We expect the government’s recent announcement on the removal of floor rates for voice call charges to have only a limited impact on growth.

Industry Consolidation, M&A Risk: We believe the recently announced merger between Hutchison Telecommunications Lanka (Private) Ltd and Etisalat Lanka (Private) Ltd is likely to relieve some competitive pressures that have undermined telecom companies’ revenue and EBITDA growth in recent years. The merger is pending regulatory approval. Industry consolidation is likely to provide some relief from pricing pressure, especially in the data segment where telcos have not been able to fully capture the strong growth in data traffic.
SLT’s National Long-Term Rating could come under pressure if it were to carry out a debt-funded acquisition of the smallest telco – Bharti Airtel Limited’s (BBB-/Stable) Sri Lankan subsidiary, Airtel Lanka. However, any rating action will be based on the acquisition price, funding structure, and the financial and operating profile of the combined entity.

Stable Sector Outlook: Fitch’s outlook for the Sri Lankan telco sector is stable as we expect the mean net leverage for SLT and mobile market leader, Dialog Axiata PLC (AAA(lka)/Stable), to remain stable at around 1.4x in 2019. We expect the sector’s cash generation to improve, driven by higher mobile and broadband data usage, which will be insufficient, however, to fund the large capex requirement, leading to negative FCF. We also expect average operating EBITDAR margins to remain stable at around 34% (2018 estimate: 34%), driven by improving economies of scale in the data and home broadband segment, offsetting the negative impact of the changing revenue mix.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

SLT’s standalone rating reflects its moderate financial profile and strong market position in the fixed-line industry segment, and second-largest position in the mobile market. SLT has lower exposure to the crowded mobile market and more diverse service platforms than Dialog.
However, Dialog has a larger revenue base and better operating EBITDAR margin than SLT, while SLT’s forecast FFO adjusted net leverage and FCF profile are worse than that of Dialog.
SLT has a larger operating scale and a wider EBITDAR margin than Hemas Holdings PLC (AA-(lka)/Stable), which is a diversified conglomerate with exposure to pharmaceuticals, fastmoving consumer goods, leisure and transport. Hemas is the largest private retail pharmaceutical distributor in the country and the second-largest home care and personal care manufacturer. Hemas’s FFO adjusted net leverage is likely to be better than SLT’s over the medium term.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch’s Key Assumptions Within Our Rating Case for the Issuer

– Revenue to grow by the mid-single-digit percentage, driven by fixed-broadband and mobile data services in 2018-2019.

– Capex/revenue to remain high at around 28%-30% as SLT expands its fibre and 3G/4G networks.

– Operating EBITDAR margin to remain stable at around 29%-30%.

– Effective tax rate of 28%.

– Dividend payout of LKR1.6 billion-1.8 billion.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive Rating Action

– An upgrade in Sri Lanka’s IDRs would result in corresponding action on SLT’s IDRs;

– A weakening of links between SLT and the sovereign could result in SLT’s Local-Currency IDR being upgraded above Sri Lanka’s Local-Currency IDR. However, SLT’s Foreign-Currency IDR will remain constrained by Sri Lanka’s Country Ceiling of ‘B’

There is no scope for an upgrade as SLT is at the highest rating on the Sri Lankan national ratings scale.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative Rating Action

– A downgrade of Sri Lanka’s IDRs would result in corresponding action on SLT’s IDRs;

– A debt-funded acquisition of a smaller operator could threaten SLT’s National Long-Term Rating, depending on the acquisition price and the financial profile of the combined entity.
For the sovereign rating of Sri Lanka, the following sensitivities were outlined by Fitch in its Rating Action Commentary of 4 December 2018:

The main factors that, individually or collectively, might lead to positive rating action are: – Improvement in external finances supported by higher non-debt inflows, or a reduction in external sovereign refinancing risks from an improved liability profile

– Improved policy coherence and credibility

– Stronger public finances, underpinned by a credible medium-term fiscal strategy

The main factors that could lead to negative rating action, individually or collectively, are:

– Further increases in external funding stresses that threaten the ability to repay external debt

– Continued political uncertainty that contributes to a loss of investor confidence, possibly affecting the macroeconomic outlook

– A deterioration in policy coherence and credibility that leads to an increase in general government debt and deficit levels.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Strong Access to Local Banks: At end-September 2018, SLT’s liquidity – cash of LKR12 billion and committed undrawn bank lines of LKR13.5 billion – was sufficient to fund its short-term debt of LKR13.5 billion. We expect SLT to refinance its short-term debt in light of its access to local banks. It has demonstrated a solid track record of accessing capital from local banks and capital markets. Total debt was about LKR53 billion, out of which about 25% was denominated in US dollars.
(COLOMBO, 05 December 2018)
 

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Sri Lanka’s flash floods in capital point to systemic institutional failure, ignored directives

ECONOMYNEXT – As torrential monsoon downpours transformed Sri Lanka’s commercial capital’s thoroughfares into raging brown rivers on Friday (06) submerging vehicles, paralyzing public transit, and inundating critical facilities like the National Hospital, the crisis was framed by authorities as an act of nature.

But for the millions of residents wading through waist-deep water, the disaster was not merely meteorological. It was man-made, preventable, and a glaring testament to gross institutional negligence.

Vraîe Cally Balthazaar, the Mayor of the island nation’s biggest local governing body Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) posted on her FaceBook (Meta) platform just a week ago before the floods that people in her ward “have had to live with the risk of flooding for years” after the stormwater drain running through the Jawatta Public Cemetery collapsed in 2019.

She said in the post that she promised the residents that the CMC would get the repairs done before the end of September, and she was happy to say that the CMC has “managed to complete the work by September 15.

“And sometimes, something as simple as fixing a drain can make a real difference to an entire neighbourhood,” Balthazaar said.

However, the flash floods saw the same area heavily flooded despite the ‘fixing’ by the CMC.

Just 24 days before the floods, Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya herself issued a direct, unequivocal order to government officials and municipal authorities to treat the cleaning of Colombo’s canal and drainage systems as an exceptional priority.

She directed to expedite the work and complete it within two weeks to ensure proper rainwater management amid anticipated increases in rainfall.

Prime Minister Amarasuriya issued these directives while addressing the Colombo District Coordinating Committee meeting held on October 13 at the Narahenpita District Secretariat.

During the meeting, officials from divisional secretariat offices, the Agrarian Development Department, and the Provincial Irrigation Department highlighted existing challenges in cleaning drainage and canal systems, noting issues such as a shortage of technical officers and difficulties faced in formulating plans and estimates.

Her instruction came in response to early meteorological indicators pointing toward an intensifying inter-monsoonal rainfall season.

But the floods last week proved that these directives had been ignored, delayed, and left unimplemented by the very bodies sworn to protect the city’s populace.

Recognizing the chronic vulnerability of the commercial capital’s low-lying geography, the Prime Minister instructed relevant stakeholders to systematically clear Colombo’s primary canals, secondary outlets, and subterranean drainage systems.

Crucially, the directive came with a strict deadline: a two-week window to complete the comprehensive clearing of blockages, silt, and solid waste that choke the city’s waterways.

Colombo would not have had last week’s floods, had the Prime Minister’s instruction been heeded and executed.

But the Prime Minister’s instruction designed precisely to preempt the catastrophic urban flooding that has chronically plagued Colombo during heavy weather was ignored.

Yet, when the skies opened up last Friday (06), the two-week deadline had long expired into the ether of bureaucratic inaction.

The canals remained congested with plastic debris, unauthorized construction bottlenecks, and thick layers of silt.

The drainage systems, starved of maintenance, failed instantly.

Neither the central government machinery nor the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) can wash their hands of accountability.

The ‘Clean Sri Lanka’ programme under the current government has been created to deal with prevention of flooding among many other ambitious goals.

“The responsibility for this damage must be borne by the President even more than the Mayor,” former Urban Development and Megapolis Minister Champika Ranawaka, a strong government critic, said on his YouTube platform.

“He is the head of the disaster management apparatus, and ‘Clean Sri Lanka’ operates under his direct leadership. Because of his actions and their administrative conduct, the entire state machinery has been brought to a standstill.”

Anatomy of Municipal Paralysis

When orders from the higher office like Prime Minister of the state can be casually sidelined by municipal inertia, it exposes a profound fracture in governance, one where public safety is compromised by institutional paralysis.

At the heart of Colombo’s drainage crisis is a systemic failure of local governance and inter-agency coordination.

The Colombo Municipal Council, tasked with the day-to-day stewardship of municipal infrastructure, waste management, and local drainage networks, has long operated in an administrative comfort zone characterized by reactive posturing rather than proactive mitigation.

When the Prime Minister’s directive was issued in mid-October, it should have triggered an immediate emergency mobilization.

Municipal work crews, heavy machinery, and desilting operations ought to have been deployed across every vulnerable ward, from the commercial hubs of Fort and Pettah to densely populated residential quarters like Borella, Wellawatte, and Grandpass.

Instead, citizens witnessed what can only be described as administrative inertia.

Bureaucratic red tape, sluggish procurement of maintenance contracts, and a lack of accountability mechanisms meant that instructions from the Prime Minister trickled down into endless committee meetings rather than field operations.

By treating a critical pre-monsoon cleanup as a routine administrative task rather than an urgent, life-saving imperative, municipal officials displayed a reckless disregard for urban risk management.

The government repeatedly said it has collected ample tax revenue to run the country. But that money could not be used urgently to protect the Colombo city when it was evident what was going to happen as per Prime Minister Amarasuriya’s instructions.

Furthermore, the failure extends beyond mere delayed cleanups to encompass chronic structural enforcement failures.

Over decades, Colombo’s natural hydrological buffers including its wetlands, marshes, and secondary flood retention areas have been systematically degraded or encroached upon by uncoordinated commercial and residential developments.

When drainage systems are clogged with garbage while vital retention pathways are blocked by concrete, even a standard heavy downpour is bound to trigger catastrophe.

Friday’s deluge merely exposed the cumulative cost of this willful administrative blindness.

Economic Toll of Negligence

The consequences of this systemic failure were borne immediately by ordinary citizens and critical public infrastructure.

The inundation of the National Hospital of Sri Lanka, where floodwaters unprecedentedly breached critical service areas, should be considered a national scandal.

That a premier healthcare institution can be crippled within 2 hours of heavy rain, jeopardizing patient care and compromising sterile environments, illustrates the deadly stakes of municipal failure.

Beyond the hospitals, small business owners watched their livelihoods float away, commuters were stranded for hours in gridlocked, submerged buses, and low-income families residing in underserved settlements suffered extensive property damage.

For an urban economy trying to anchor Sri Lanka’s fragile post-crisis recovery, recurring paralyzing floods exact a heavy toll in lost productivity, infrastructure damage, and emergency response costs.

Accountability

The CMC and government have pointed fingers at the illegal structures erected under past governments for the latest disaster. But this government has already been in power for two years.

In the aftermath of the disaster, routine finger-pointing between central agencies and municipal bodies also has begun, with officials attempting to deflect blame onto unprecedented rainfall volumes.

But meteorological data offers no refuge for negligent administrators.

The rainfall, while heavy, was seasonally anticipated; indeed, it was precisely why the Prime Minister issued her October directive.

When a directive issued by the second-in-command of the country is left gathering dust on a municipal desk while citizens face preventable devastation, the social contract breaks down.

The current government and the Colombo Municipal Council cannot hide behind excuses of resource constraints or administrative oversight.

Preventing flash floods requires more than issuing seasonal press releases or convening post-disaster committees after the water has receded.

It demands rigorous enforcement, transparent institutional accountability, and a zero-tolerance approach to administrative lethargy.

If the authorities cannot execute basic drainage maintenance, Colombo will remain structurally vulnerable, hostage to the next raincloud, and failed by the very institutions meant to protect it. (Colombo/November 08/2026)

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Sri Lanka rupee closes at 332.53/59 to US dollar spot, bond yields edge up

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka’s rupee closed at 332.53/59 to the US dollar spot on Monday, from 332.55/60 the previous day, while bond yields closed higher, dealers said.

A bond maturing on 15.09.2029 closed at 190/98 percent, up from 10.85/95 percent.

A bond maturing on 01.08.2030 closed at 11.07/12 percent, up from 11.05/10 percent.

A bond maturing on 01.02.2031 closed at 11.30/40 percent, up from 11.10/15 percent.

A bond maturing on 15.12.2032 closed at 11.65/70 percent, up from 11.55/65 percent.

A bond maturing on 01.11.2033 closed at 11.95/12.00 percent, up from 11.90/95 percent.

A bond maturing on 15.10.2034 closed at 12.10/15 percent, up from 12.05/12 percent.

A bond maturing on 15.08.2036 closed at 12.40/50 percent, up from 12.30/40 percent. (Colombo/Nov9/2026)

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Sri Lanka stocks close up 1.37-pct, banks lead turnover

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka’s Colombo Stock Exchange closed up on Monday, CSE data showed, with the benchmark All Share Price Index moving up 1.37 percent.

The ASPI was up 291.72 points at 21,531.37, while the more liquid S&P SL20 was up 1.67 percent, or 100.96 points, at 6,146.34.

Positive contributors to the ASPI were Commercial Bank of Ceylon (up 2.86 percent at 216.00 rupees), Hatton National Bank (up 1.52 percent at 399.75 rupees), Asiri Hospital Holdings (up 12.86 percent at 31.60 rupees), Tokyo Cement Company (up 5.22 percent at 84.70 rupees), and Access Engineering (up 3.93 percent at 81.90 rupees).

Carson Cumberbatch (down 4.24 percent at 712.00 rupees), Richard Pieris and Company (down 2.43 percent at 28.10 rupees), LOLC Holdings (down 0.62 percent at 400.00 rupees), Renuka Holdings (down 2.63 percent at 37.00 rupees), and Chevron Lubricants Lanka (down 0.61 percent at 204.25 rupees) were top negative contributors.

Market turnover was 3.33 billion rupees. The S&P/CSE Banks Industry Group led turnover with 667.76 million rupees.

The session saw heavy crossings, according to Raynal Wickremeratne, Head of Research and Strategy at NDB Securities. Significant crossings included Keells (23 million rupees), Distilleries Company (27.7 million rupees), Sunshine Holdings (30.6 million rupees), Commercial Bank (32.4 million rupees), Ceylon Tobacco Company (35.6 million rupees), Hatton National Bank (39.5 million rupees), Prime Lands (40.5 million rupees), and HAS Holdings (41.5 million rupees).

In corporate news, Hayleys Retail Holdings Ltd announced it has partnered with supply chain software provider Blue Yonder to build and scale an AI-native grocery supermarket chain across Sri Lanka. (Colombo/Nov09/2026)

 

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Sri Lanka’s Hayleys Retail to launch supermarket chain with Blue Yonder

ECONOMYNEXT — Hayleys Retail Holdings Ltd has selected supply chain software provider Blue Yonder to build its grocery retail operations from the ground up, the two companies said in a joint statement.

Hayleys Retail, a member of Sri Lanka’s diversified conglomerate Hayleys Group, plans to open several stores in the near future to serve consumers across the country. The agreement marks Blue Yonder’s first retail customer in Sri Lanka.

“Our entry into supermarket retail is about bringing that same commitment to quality and reliability closer to everyday Sri Lankan consumers,” Mohan Pandithage, Chairman and Chief Executive of Hayleys PLC said.

“With Blue Yonder, our teams will have AI-driven insight to deliver a seamless, consistent shopping experience across every store,” he said.

Hayleys, which accounts for approximately 5 percent of Sri Lanka’s export income and operates across 17 business sectors, is entering the large-scale supermarket space by drawing on its group strengths in manufacturing, logistics, and services.

The company selected Blue Yonder to connect its data across merchandising and shelf space, deploy artificial intelligence agents to catch operational issues early, and scale its business into a national network without changing platforms.

The rollout will begin with merchandise operations to manage suppliers, items, costs, and pricing, followed by machine learning capabilities to forecast demand and balance store inventory during seasonal peaks.

“Hayleys Retail is choosing one where AI is the foundation rather than an add-on—connected data and agentic AI built into core merchandising operations, and planning that learns as the business grows,” Antonio Boccalandro, President, APAC at Blue Yonder said.

The retailer plans to use the platform to automate routine store tasks and adjust inventory according to real-time sales and local market trends as its store footprint grows. (Colombo/Nov09/2026)

 

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Sri Lanka’s Citrus Leisure extends Lotus Tower management pact

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka listed hospitality firm Citrus Leisure said it has extended an agreement to manage consumer-facing and entertainment spaces at the Colombo Lotus Tower, which includes revolving restaurant Blue Orbit, until June next year.

The initial agreement signed between Citrus Leisure and Colombo Lotus Tower Management Company (Private) Limited (CLTMC) is due to expire on December 11.

“The Board of Directors of CLTMC at meeting held on 2nd November 2026 has resolved to extend the term of the Management Agreement and continue the existing Management Agreement until 30th June 2027, to which the company has given its concurrence,” the company said in a market filing.

Citrus Leisure Plc opened its revolving restaurant at the Lotus Tower in December 2023.

The company signed a 3-year agreement with CLTMC in May 2023 to provide services in the management of (l) the banquet hall 1 on the 25th floor, (2) the banquet hall 2 on the 26th floor, (3) the revolving restaurant on the 27th floor, (4) the 6 suites situated on the 28th floor and the kitchen in the basement floor of the Colombo Lotus Tower.

The 350-meter or 1,150-feet tower, the tallest in South Asia, was built at a cost 104.3 million US dollars with 80 percent of the money borrowed from Exim Bank of China.

Located in the commercial heart of Colombo, the tower has been called a symbolic landmark of Sri Lanka as well as a colossal white elephant and has been mired in controversy for years. (Colombo/Nov9/2026)

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CIC Holdings Sept quarter net profit rises 20-pct to Rs1.7bn

ECONOMYNEXT — Sri Lanka conglomerate CIC Holdings recorded a net profit of 1.66 billion rupees for the quarter ended September 30, rising 20.3 percent from 1.38 billion rupees in the same quarter last year, interim accounts showed.

The group posted basic earnings per share of 0.87 rupees for the September quarter, up from 0.73 rupees a year earlier.

Quarterly revenue grew 3.4 percent to 20.89 billion rupees from 20.20 billion rupees, supported by broad-based growth across industrial solutions, livestock, and healthcare segments, which counterbalanced relative demand moderation in agricultural inputs.

Cost of sales rose 5.3 percent to 15.20 billion rupees, outpacing revenue growth and causing gross profit to contract marginally by 1.2 percent to 5.68 billion rupees.

Results from operating activities dropped 7.3 percent to 2.66 billion rupees from 2.87 billion rupees, impacted by higher operating overheads.

Selling expenses expanded 6.8 percent to 2.15 billion rupees, and general and administrative expenses climbed 5.8 percent to 1.07 billion rupees, while other operating income dropped 29.6 percent to 117.40 million rupees.

However, operating profits were cushioned by an impairment reversal on trade receivables of 85.83 million rupees, turning around from an impairment provision of 23.38 million rupees in the corresponding quarter last year.

Net finance costs climbed 35.4 percent to 712.25 million rupees from 526.01 million rupees.

The increase was driven by a 30.8 percent rise in finance expenses to 771.46 million rupees, primarily reflecting higher interest expenses on loans to finance elevated working capital and inventory requirements.

The quarter’s bottom line was strongly bolstered by CIC’s equity-accounted investment in John Keells Holdings PLC (JKH).

Share of profit from equity-accounted investees surged more than fourfold to 590.50 million rupees from 257.87 million rupees, driven by JKH’s strong profit expansion during the period.

The group also recognized a gain on bargain purchase of 55.59 million rupees during the quarter resulting from additional share purchases in JKH where the proportionate net asset value exceeded acquisition cost, compared to no such gain a year earlier.

With associate income gains offsetting operating margin contraction and higher borrowing costs, group pre-tax profit held virtually flat at 2.59 billion rupees, down 0.11 percent.

Income tax expense fell 29.4 percent to 606.24 million rupees from 858.71 million rupees, driving total group profit for the period up 14.1 percent to 1.98 billion rupees.

Total group assets stood at 108.58 billion rupees as of September 30, up from 99.75 billion rupees at the end of March 2026.

Group net asset value per share increased to 25.52 rupees from 22.10 rupees a year earlier.

CIC Holdings’ ordinary voting shares closed at 27.80 rupees at the end of September.(Colombo/Nov09/2026)

 

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