ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka’s private credit is recovering from the latest currency crisis triggered by rate cuts to target output and high cost of living increase of 5 percent, and red flags are going up.

There are several red flags and one green one.

The biggest red flag is the single policy rate and state liquidity forecasts for private banks for which technical assistance has come from the International Monetary Fund.

As Sri Lanka is celebrating its independence, the macroeconomists are giving some limited freedom to buy cars. Gazette issued shows penalty taxes for holding stocks.

This is based on a column originally published on Echelon Magazine in February 2025

Meanwhile there are price controls for rice and heavy import duties. Exchange controls are also in place.

It is a sad plight for a country to be in 76 years after independence. And that is the second red flag.

From Scarce Reserves to Excess (or Ample) Reserve Framework

The single policy rate is the reddest of the red flags.

Under a corridor system, especially a wide corridor, the central bank only prints barely enough money for commercial banks which mis-manage their liquidity to clear transactions.

Without liquidity auctions, banks have to borrow at the top of the corridor at a rate slightly higher than the overnight market rate at times.

However when a mid-corridor rate is targeted, or a single rate is targeted, there is excess liquidity with banks bidding for easy money at low rates.

This was seen in October 2024 in particular.

For example, on September 03 the central bank offered 15 billion rupees through a liquidity auction, for which 36.28 billion rupees of bids came from banks. But since 15 billion was offered 15 billion was given at 8.51 percent, when the ceiling rate was 9.25 percent.

At 9.25 percent only 0.65 billion was borrowed. Though banks bid 36.58 billion rupees, the day’s transactions were cleared at 15.65 billion rupees, which is less than half the volume bid.

Banks will clear transactions by borrowing from clients or reducing credit if they were forced to do through a corridor system.

On September 05, 20 billion rupees was offered, 25.61 billion was bid. Since 20 billion rupees was offered, only 20 billion was given. There were no borrowings from the window.

If there was no liquidity offered, banks would soon learn to operate without central bank money. Foreign banks usually do that.

This is how scarce reserve frameworks work or borrowing small amounts from the ceiling window.

On September 09, 60 billion rupees was offered, 54.05 billion was bid and all bidders were given printed money. The lowest rate was 8.26 percent, which was one basis point above the lower policy corridor. The bidder obviously did not care whether they got any cash or not.

The big changes are because some money is also offered for a week or two through term auctions and some of them mature.

The lesser the variation in the daily rates, the higher the excess liquidity that is required. They have to be injected for days on end and weeks.

Ample or Excess Reserve Framework

Modern central banks in the age of inflation and volatile commodity and food prices give liquidity at the drop of a hat, like this.

If there is a ceiling rate it is reduced.

Up to the last quarter of 2024 the central bank was steadily selling down its Treasury bills portfolio, in a deflationary framework where liquidity from dollar purchases were constantly withdrawn, creating a BOP surplus which allowed more dollars to be bought.

Now the central bank has run out of Treasury bills to sell.

When liquidity is injected, reserve money is inflated.

The current madness with excess liquidity, had its roots in the end of the Great Moderation where the in the United States, a narrower 25 basis point rate was targeted.

And then the policy rate was brought to almost zero by the Fed, mis-understanding a productivity driven price index fall as a deflationary collapse (debt deflation).

After firing a Housing Bubble, in the style of John Law’s Mississippi Bubble, through what was then called the ‘mother of all liquidity bubbles’ the problem worsened.

After the collapse of the Housing Bubble, due to quantity easing, a large volume of excess liquidity was generated in a great grandmother of liquidity bubbles.

Banks – which had a lot of bad loans and were also hit by the Frank Dodd Law – were initially not using the liquidity and were re-depositing them in the Fed. The Fed started to pay interest on them as well.

As the presence of excess liquidity got normalized, the Fed then said there was no reserve requirement at all.

And then suddenly it was an ‘ample reserve’ framework. No liquidity was ‘excess’.

READ MORE Implementing Monetary Policy in an “Ample-Reserves” Regime: The Basics (Note 1 of 3)

It is in this context that Sri Lanka is going into a single policy rate, regular liquidity auctions and targeting call money rates very narrowly.

This is deadly for a country which is trying to collect foreign reserves.

Reserve collection requires deflationary policy – gentle deflationary policy will keep the exchange rate stable through a scarce reserves regime.

Mis-pricing Risks, Destroying Market Discipline

The single policy rate and narrowly targeting the call money rate has other implications.

The call money rate is a clean rate which is supposed to be risky. However, it is happening among some prime banks with some limits to each other.

At the moment the un-backed call rate is below the treasury bill backed, repo market.

This is not normal.

(This column is based on one that was originally published in the Echelon Magazine of February 2025, but the trend is basically the same, except that the ‘signalled’ single policy rate turned out to be higher than rates further along the yield curve by late March. This phenomenon however will prevent an external default rather than create one.)

However, we can argue like this. The foreign banks are safer than government securities which are from a defaulted government.

Whatever it is, when the central bank gives liquidity, for days on end and weeks on end, banks that cannot borrow in the market, can escape the market discipline and trade with printed money, for days and weeks on end.

Eventually this money will turn into credit and imports, leading to loss of reserves, especially in the context of debt repayments.

One of the reasons banks in central bank regimes collapse and those in currency boards and dollarized areas do not collapse is due to the lack of these easy money.

Banks then become tightly managed.

When the US collapses due to the policy rate and open market operations, Hong Kong, which is a currency board, does not see banks collapses. Therefore when US rates fall there is a spike in property prices in Hong Kong because banks are healthy.

When the Housing Bubble collapsed, Dubai saw only one or two banks fail or threatened to fail. In Panama which is dollarized, only one bank failed or threatened to fail.

That is also why areas like Hong Kong, Cambodia, or Panama have low debt to GDP ratios. Just like bad money leads to bad budgets, good money leads to good budgets.

The Vehicle Import Debacle

The vehicle import restrictions also show that there is no knowledge about the matter.

In the absence of (inflationary) open market operations there is no problem with the balance of payments.

This column has previously explained why.

Related : Sri Lanka vehicle imports not a threat to rupee but inflationary open market operations will be

Nobody can buy anything without money they do not have. The only way to do that is to get credit – and in the absence of open market operations – one type of credit has to crowd out another.

If cars are imported through a loan, then a hotel project will have to wait until deposit and loan repayments come to banks or finance companies.

The reason countries have foreign exchange rate shortages and currency crises is due to credit being re-financed by the central bank through open market operations or other means which allows the car and some other loan like that for a building to be also given at the same time.

There is no need to put restrictions on the import of cars, or on stocks of cars kept by dealers. It is up to the dealers to waste money and keep fleets of unsold imported cars paying the correct market interest rate on working capital.

All vehicles stocks will do is to drive up interest rates a little and delay the ability of a bank to give another credit unless new deposits come.

If money is injected to target a single policy rate, or domestic market dollar rupee swaps are done, the same thing that happened in 2011, 2015, 2018 and 2020-2022 will happen – which causes forex shortages.

The reason Sri Lanka has had low inflation since September 2022 is due to the central bank’s deflationary policy of selling down Treasury bills and running a scarce reserve framework due to the IMF’s requirement to sell down the bill stock.

It is not because of the Ceylon Electricity Board.

Green Flag

The one green flag is the Central Bank Governor’s statement that he will sell down the central bank’s Treasury bonds stock.

If there is no ceiling on domestic assets in the next IMF program, Sri Lanka will have forex shortages and have currency crises like in the 2012 and 2018 inside the program and foreign reserve targets will be missed.

Related Sri Lanka central bank to sell down its restructured bonds

Then the second default is inevitable.

If central bank securities (its own securities) are sold it is not a very good thing as past experience has shown. The central bank is then tempted not to roll-over the securities as market rates rise, as happens in Argentina.

However if the g-sec portfolio sold down, it is no longer the central bank’s responsibility to ensure their roll-over.

Dollar swaps are worse in a country like Sri Lanka with the liquidity-happy central bank and a single policy rate.

Central bank can convert its step down government bonds into a more simple marketable security, perhaps a floating rate one based on the 3-month bill yield.

The IMF lacks the knowledge to maintain monetary stability. Their technical assistance has the opposite effect. Sri Lanka had serial currency crises, and defaulted due to running an excess reserve (or ample reserves to use the modern term) from mid-corridor targeting.

The mid corridor targeting which led to the excess reserve framework has now been legalized through the new monetary law and a gazette issued for the single policy rate.

The 100 billion rupees printed in October/November is a foretaste of things to come, unless the central bank held bonds are converted to a marketable instrument and used to run a scarce reserve framework.

Sri Lanka’s macroeconomists have battered the people with printed money for decades, injecting money into banks and blaming politicians for deficits when inflation went up and people demanded salary hikes and subsidies.

Now it is open market operations after ‘monetary policy modernization’.

At the time it was central bank re-finance. The Import and Export Control Act was brought in 1969 when the central bank was doing re-finance credit.

The people are innocent of creating forex shortages or inflation. Politicians are also largely innocent at least of inflation and exchange rate trouble.

Their crimes are not destroying salaries and pushing up prices. Their problems are in how they react.

They impose price controls and create shortages or they become authoritative and crack down on dissent when macroeconomists fire commodity bubbles and debase currencies.

When the current government said they did not print money when the central bank printed 100 billion through open market operations shows the problem.

Politicians have little idea about what macro-economists get up to. When they try to get advice they have to ask macroeconomists, who have rejected in toto economics of money and banking (then called Political Economy) so painstakingly developed by Hume (primarily) and Ricardo and also Smith.

To be sure it was the 1960s that macroeconomists in the US worsened inflationism, claiming that there was a trade-off between inflation and employment and busted the Bretton Woods.

Now it is an ‘ample reserves’ regime in the US.

But in the final analysis politicians are to blame. They are the people who make the law.

Deflationary Policy and Negative Unemployment

Enough countries have made laws to tie the hands of macro-economists and reduce their ability to centrally plan interest rates and have achieved monetary stability. They import labour and have become countries with outward remittances.

They have deflationary policy and negative unemployment. (i.e an employment above permanent residents)

Hard pegs (inflexible exchange rates) with floating interest rates are one type. Floating rate with very low inflation targets of two percent or below also sharply reduces the flexibility to centrally plan interest rates.

The Fed calls its new regime ‘flexible average inflation targeting’ (FAIT). This is much worse than the earlier ‘bygones are bygones’ regime.

Under a clean float it is not possible to create forex shortages and reserve losses in the US, but it is still possible to fire asset price bubbles. Under an abundant reserve system there is a government debt bubble.

The current troubles in the US Treasury bond markets are self-created and pre-dated Trump. Trump is simply the straw that broke the Camels back.

The festering problems in the US debt markets are several years in the making, starting from the false accusations of the ‘Asian savings glut’ in the course of firing the Housing bubble and firming up under stimulus and the ARS system.

By encouraging countries like China and other Asian countries to break harder pegs, the IMF itself killed the market for US bonds (Bretton Woods II), which to his credit, Harry Dexter White had done with the setting up of the original Bretton Woods I and killing off the Sterling Area.

As fully explained in the following column bad money leads to bad budgets.

Read more here: Sri Lanka could get hit from a disorderly US tumble: Bellwether

All these techniques to deceive parliaments cooked up by the US stimulus brigade then end up as technical assistance through the IMF to unfortunate countries like Sri Lanka or Africa.

After the Great Depression some of these techniques filtered directly to Latin America due to the close proximity of Saltwater universities – without IMF help which was not set up at the time – from the 1930s.

In Sri Lanka it is ‘flexible’ exchange and ‘flexible’ inflation targeting, that is coming from the US via the IMF.

IMF gives horrendous (monetary) technical assistance that makes your hair stand on end.

The single policy rate and state liquidity forecasts which promote lending in-discipline is the latest. IMF-backed African nations which defaulted have had the so-called Monetary Policy Rate for some time.

Millions of Sri Lankans leave the country to the Middle East where there are ‘inflexible’ exchange rates.

But the people do not have to leave the county of their birth just because the central bank does open market operations or print money, if the parliament can control the macro-economists through a strict law.

The parliament has the legislative power which can be used on behalf of the poor, and on behalf of stability as was done in the UK and other countries before the 1930s.
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The IMF’s problem is not the rate hikes, stabilization crises, austerity and the ad hoc tax hikes it persuades countries to engage in.

Its problem is the deadly technical assistance it gives on how to print money in new and innovative ways triggering forex shortages, import restrictions, exchange controls and ultimately external default which makes stabilization crises necessary to save the central bank’s money monopoly.

As economist Robert Barro once wrote, the IMF does not put out fires, it lights them. Unfortunately there is substantial truth in what he said.

Now that the IMF has helped restructure debt, and fix budgets, there are diminishing returns in following inflationist frameworks that will lead to renewed monetary instability.

It is not the lack of reform that keeps Sri Lanka going back to the IMF. It is inflationism from the very technical advice that the IMF gives especially after the 1978 Second Amendment to its Articles.

Bad technical advice has taken a quantum jump after the Fed fired the housing bubble and developed nations shifted to an Abundant Reserve System making inflation uncontrollable and triggering 60s/70s style strikes and political unrest. (Colombo/May14/2025 – Corrected Sept 05 money auction data)