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Monday November 9th, 2026

Fitch affirms Ostrum SRI Money Plus Fund at ‘Af’/’S1’

ECONOMYNEXT – Ostrum SRI Money Plus Fund’s international fund credit quality rating (FCQR) and fund market risk sensitivity rating (MRSR) has been affirmed at ‘Af’/’S1’ by Fitch Ratings.

“The FCQR reflects the overall credit profile and vulnerability to losses from defaults, and the MRSR reflects the overall sensitivity to market risk,” Fitch Ratings said.

The ‘Af’ FCQR indicates high underlying credit quality (or low vulnerability to default).

The ‘S1’ MRSR indicates very low sensitivity to market risk.

The full statement in reproduced below:

Fitch Affirms Ostrum SRI Money Plus at ‘Af’/’S1’

Fitch Ratings – London: Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ostrum SRI Money Plus Fund’s International Fund Credit Quality Rating (FCQR) and Fund Market Risk Sensitivity Rating (MRSR) at ‘Af’/’S1’. The fund is managed by Ostrum Asset Management

The FCQR reflects the overall credit profile and vulnerability to losses from defaults, and the MRSR reflects the overall sensitivity to market risk.

Fitch used actual portfolio holdings received from Ostrum Asset Management as of 31 March 2026 and reviewed the fund’s investment policy and governing documentation (prospectus and approved guidelines), to complete the analysis for the rating action.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings reflect Fitch’s review of the fund’s actual portfolio, investment and credit guidelines, actual credit quality and diversification, and Ostrum’s asset management capabilities. The ‘Af’ FCQR indicates high underlying credit quality (or low vulnerability to default). The ‘S1’ MRSR indicates very low sensitivity to market risk. FCQRs and MRSRs do not address the probability of extraordinary liquidity management measures or the fund’s redemption risk.

Portfolio Credit Quality: The portfolio’s weighted average rating factor (WARF) primarily drives the FCQR. The WARF reflects the credit ratings and remaining term to maturity of the securities, weighted by market value. The portfolio’s 0.55 WARF falls below 0.9 threshold, corresponding to ‘AAf’ WARF-implied FCQR. The fund’s investment guidelines provide it with flexibility to increase its allocation to lower-quality, unrated or longer-dated securities. Accordingly, Fitch has calibrated the ratings to the fund’s investment guidelines, resulting in an FCQR of ‘Af’ (range of 0.9-2.1).

A small portion of the portfolio can be invested in securities not rated by a globally recognised credit rating agency. The asset manager performs a credit analysis on all the entities and deems these entities to be equivalent to investment-grade and part of its money market fund investable universe. Following its criteria, Fitch assumes a ‘CCC’ rating for these assets for the purpose of its WARF calculation, resulting in a material WARF contribution from these securities versus other securities in the portfolio.

Permitted investments include private or public entities in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) zone that issue negotiable debt securities or short-term bonds denominated in euros or any other currency of the OECD zone with maturities up to two years. The fund is permitted to invest in derivatives.

Market Risk: The fund’s ‘S1’ MRSR indicates very low sensitivity to market risk. The fund’s market risk factor (MRF), which is Fitch’s proprietary measure of market risk sensitivity under the Bond Fund Rating Criteria, was within the ‘S1’ MRSR range. The portfolio’s MRF of 0.31 falls below the 0.2 threshold, corresponding to a ‘S1’ MRSR.

The fund’s weighted average maturity (WAM), which measures sensitivity to interest-rate risk, and weighted average life (WAL), which measures sensitivity to spread risk, were in line with the fund’s investment guidelines. The fund maintains a WAM of no more than six months and a WAL of no more than 12 months. The fund uses interest rate swaps to hedge its exposure to interest rates. During the review period from October 2024 to March 2026, the fund had risk exposure to interest rate swaps of less than 1% of the total portfolio.

Fund Profile: Fitch views the legal and regulatory frameworks of the fund as satisfactory. The fund is a fonds communs de placement, that falls under SICAV directive and is domiciled in France. The fund is authorised and supervised by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers as a money market fund.

The fund’s investment objective is to achieve an annualised performance superior to that of the capitalised euro short-term rate over its recommended minimum investment period, by integrating into its management an approach that aims to select assets and financial instruments that respect environmental, social/societal and governance responsibility criteria, after deduction of the fixed operating and management costs applicable to each class of units of the fund. The fund’s total assets were USD19.6 billion at end-March 2026.

Participant Profile: The fund is available to retail and institutional investors subject to minimum investment requirements that vary depending on the specific unit of class being purchased.

Stress Tests: Fitch conducted stress tests as outlined in its Bond Fund Rating Criteria, including concentration and credit barbelling stresses, to test the sensitivity of the fund’s rating against potential changes in the portfolio credit quality. There was no material deterioration in the WARF or MRF of the portfolio because of these stressed scenarios, supporting Fitch’s view that the portfolio’s credit quality is consistent with criteria guidelines at the assigned rating.

Portfolio Composition: Fitch deems the overall portfolio quality to be sound and concentrations are managed prudently. At 31 March 2026, over 62% of the fund’s portfolio was invested in certificates of deposit and commercial papers, and approximately 29% of the portfolio’s assets mature within 31 and 90 days. The portfolio did not use any leverage at the review date.

Derivatives: The fund is permitted to use derivatives for hedging purposes. At the time of Fitch’s analysis, the pool employed interest rate swaps representing 0.02% of net assets.

Surveillance: Fitch receives monthly fund portfolio holdings information including credit quality, market value and duration of the individual securities to conduct surveillance against the Bond Fund Rating Criteria.

INVESTMENT MANAGER

Ostrum Asset Management is an affiliate of Natixis Investment Managers International, the asset management business line of Natixis S.A. (A+/Stable/F1). Ostrum Asset Management had EUR388 billion of assets under management at end March 2026. Ostrum Asset Management is registered with Autorité des Marchés Financiers in France. It provides comprehensive asset management and dedicated investment services, primarily focusing on active fixed-income, equity, multi-asset, and insurance-related investment strategies.

At 31 March 2026, Ostrum Asset Management had over EUR384 billion in assets under management. They include insurance solutions, fixed-income, equities, and multi-asset strategies. As an affiliate of Natixis Investment Managers, it caters primarily to institutional investors (such as insurers, pension funds, and corporations) by providing tailored investment solutions and services.

Fitch views the investment management capabilities, resource commitment, operational controls, compliance and oversight processes of the investment advisor as appropriate for the assigned ratings and investment strategy.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative Rating Action/Downgrade
The ratings are sensitive to material changes in the credit quality and maturity profile of the fund. A material decrease in portfolio credit quality or increase in security maturities could result in a downgrade of the FCQR if the fund’s resulting WARF exceeds 2.1 and/or downgrade of the MRSR if the fund’s MRF exceeds 2.0 threshold. However, Fitch believes this is unlikely in the near term absent significant credit migration, or a change in the fund’s investment strategy.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive Rating Action/Upgrade
The FCQR could be upgraded if the fund changes its investment strategy and introduces more conservative limits on credit and ceases to invest in unrated assets. The MRSR is rated at the highest possible level and cannot be upgraded.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The sources of information used to assess these ratings include the investment policy, portfolio holdings at 31 March 2026, and information from the investment manager. (Colombo/Jun15/2026)

Sri Lanka’s flash floods in capital point to systemic institutional failure, ignored directives

ECONOMYNEXT – As torrential monsoon downpours transformed Sri Lanka’s commercial capital’s thoroughfares into raging brown rivers on Friday (06) submerging vehicles, paralyzing public transit, and inundating critical facilities like the National Hospital, the crisis was framed by authorities as an act of nature.

But for the millions of residents wading through waist-deep water, the disaster was not merely meteorological. It was man-made, preventable, and a glaring testament to gross institutional negligence.

Vraîe Cally Balthazaar, the Mayor of the island nation’s biggest local governing body Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) posted on her FaceBook (Meta) platform just a week ago before the floods that people in her ward “have had to live with the risk of flooding for years” after the stormwater drain running through the Jawatta Public Cemetery collapsed in 2019.

She said in the post that she promised the residents that the CMC would get the repairs done before the end of September, and she was happy to say that the CMC has “managed to complete the work by September 15.

“And sometimes, something as simple as fixing a drain can make a real difference to an entire neighbourhood,” Balthazaar said.

However, the flash floods saw the same area heavily flooded despite the ‘fixing’ by the CMC.

Just 24 days before the floods, Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya herself issued a direct, unequivocal order to government officials and municipal authorities to treat the cleaning of Colombo’s canal and drainage systems as an exceptional priority.

She directed to expedite the work and complete it within two weeks to ensure proper rainwater management amid anticipated increases in rainfall.

Prime Minister Amarasuriya issued these directives while addressing the Colombo District Coordinating Committee meeting held on October 13 at the Narahenpita District Secretariat.

During the meeting, officials from divisional secretariat offices, the Agrarian Development Department, and the Provincial Irrigation Department highlighted existing challenges in cleaning drainage and canal systems, noting issues such as a shortage of technical officers and difficulties faced in formulating plans and estimates.

Her instruction came in response to early meteorological indicators pointing toward an intensifying inter-monsoonal rainfall season.

But the floods last week proved that these directives had been ignored, delayed, and left unimplemented by the very bodies sworn to protect the city’s populace.

Recognizing the chronic vulnerability of the commercial capital’s low-lying geography, the Prime Minister instructed relevant stakeholders to systematically clear Colombo’s primary canals, secondary outlets, and subterranean drainage systems.

Crucially, the directive came with a strict deadline: a two-week window to complete the comprehensive clearing of blockages, silt, and solid waste that choke the city’s waterways.

Colombo would not have had last week’s floods, had the Prime Minister’s instruction been heeded and executed.

But the Prime Minister’s instruction designed precisely to preempt the catastrophic urban flooding that has chronically plagued Colombo during heavy weather was ignored.

Yet, when the skies opened up last Friday (06), the two-week deadline had long expired into the ether of bureaucratic inaction.

The canals remained congested with plastic debris, unauthorized construction bottlenecks, and thick layers of silt.

The drainage systems, starved of maintenance, failed instantly.

Neither the central government machinery nor the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) can wash their hands of accountability.

The ‘Clean Sri Lanka’ programme under the current government has been created to deal with prevention of flooding among many other ambitious goals.

“The responsibility for this damage must be borne by the President even more than the Mayor,” former Urban Development and Megapolis Minister Champika Ranawaka, a strong government critic, said on his YouTube platform.

“He is the head of the disaster management apparatus, and ‘Clean Sri Lanka’ operates under his direct leadership. Because of his actions and their administrative conduct, the entire state machinery has been brought to a standstill.”

Anatomy of Municipal Paralysis

When orders from the higher office like Prime Minister of the state can be casually sidelined by municipal inertia, it exposes a profound fracture in governance, one where public safety is compromised by institutional paralysis.

At the heart of Colombo’s drainage crisis is a systemic failure of local governance and inter-agency coordination.

The Colombo Municipal Council, tasked with the day-to-day stewardship of municipal infrastructure, waste management, and local drainage networks, has long operated in an administrative comfort zone characterized by reactive posturing rather than proactive mitigation.

When the Prime Minister’s directive was issued in mid-October, it should have triggered an immediate emergency mobilization.

Municipal work crews, heavy machinery, and desilting operations ought to have been deployed across every vulnerable ward, from the commercial hubs of Fort and Pettah to densely populated residential quarters like Borella, Wellawatte, and Grandpass.

Instead, citizens witnessed what can only be described as administrative inertia.

Bureaucratic red tape, sluggish procurement of maintenance contracts, and a lack of accountability mechanisms meant that instructions from the Prime Minister trickled down into endless committee meetings rather than field operations.

By treating a critical pre-monsoon cleanup as a routine administrative task rather than an urgent, life-saving imperative, municipal officials displayed a reckless disregard for urban risk management.

The government repeatedly said it has collected ample tax revenue to run the country. But that money could not be used urgently to protect the Colombo city when it was evident what was going to happen as per Prime Minister Amarasuriya’s instructions.

Furthermore, the failure extends beyond mere delayed cleanups to encompass chronic structural enforcement failures.

Over decades, Colombo’s natural hydrological buffers including its wetlands, marshes, and secondary flood retention areas have been systematically degraded or encroached upon by uncoordinated commercial and residential developments.

When drainage systems are clogged with garbage while vital retention pathways are blocked by concrete, even a standard heavy downpour is bound to trigger catastrophe.

Friday’s deluge merely exposed the cumulative cost of this willful administrative blindness.

Economic Toll of Negligence

The consequences of this systemic failure were borne immediately by ordinary citizens and critical public infrastructure.

The inundation of the National Hospital of Sri Lanka, where floodwaters unprecedentedly breached critical service areas, should be considered a national scandal.

That a premier healthcare institution can be crippled within 2 hours of heavy rain, jeopardizing patient care and compromising sterile environments, illustrates the deadly stakes of municipal failure.

Beyond the hospitals, small business owners watched their livelihoods float away, commuters were stranded for hours in gridlocked, submerged buses, and low-income families residing in underserved settlements suffered extensive property damage.

For an urban economy trying to anchor Sri Lanka’s fragile post-crisis recovery, recurring paralyzing floods exact a heavy toll in lost productivity, infrastructure damage, and emergency response costs.

Accountability

The CMC and government have pointed fingers at the illegal structures erected under past governments for the latest disaster. But this government has already been in power for two years.

In the aftermath of the disaster, routine finger-pointing between central agencies and municipal bodies also has begun, with officials attempting to deflect blame onto unprecedented rainfall volumes.

But meteorological data offers no refuge for negligent administrators.

The rainfall, while heavy, was seasonally anticipated; indeed, it was precisely why the Prime Minister issued her October directive.

When a directive issued by the second-in-command of the country is left gathering dust on a municipal desk while citizens face preventable devastation, the social contract breaks down.

The current government and the Colombo Municipal Council cannot hide behind excuses of resource constraints or administrative oversight.

Preventing flash floods requires more than issuing seasonal press releases or convening post-disaster committees after the water has receded.

It demands rigorous enforcement, transparent institutional accountability, and a zero-tolerance approach to administrative lethargy.

If the authorities cannot execute basic drainage maintenance, Colombo will remain structurally vulnerable, hostage to the next raincloud, and failed by the very institutions meant to protect it. (Colombo/November 08/2026)

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Sri Lanka rupee closes at 332.53/59 to US dollar spot, bond yields edge up

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka’s rupee closed at 332.53/59 to the US dollar spot on Monday, from 332.55/60 the previous day, while bond yields closed higher, dealers said.

A bond maturing on 15.09.2029 closed at 190/98 percent, up from 10.85/95 percent.

A bond maturing on 01.08.2030 closed at 11.07/12 percent, up from 11.05/10 percent.

A bond maturing on 01.02.2031 closed at 11.30/40 percent, up from 11.10/15 percent.

A bond maturing on 15.12.2032 closed at 11.65/70 percent, up from 11.55/65 percent.

A bond maturing on 01.11.2033 closed at 11.95/12.00 percent, up from 11.90/95 percent.

A bond maturing on 15.10.2034 closed at 12.10/15 percent, up from 12.05/12 percent.

A bond maturing on 15.08.2036 closed at 12.40/50 percent, up from 12.30/40 percent. (Colombo/Nov9/2026)

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Sri Lanka stocks close up 1.37-pct, banks lead turnover

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka’s Colombo Stock Exchange closed up on Monday, CSE data showed, with the benchmark All Share Price Index moving up 1.37 percent.

The ASPI was up 291.72 points at 21,531.37, while the more liquid S&P SL20 was up 1.67 percent, or 100.96 points, at 6,146.34.

Positive contributors to the ASPI were Commercial Bank of Ceylon (up 2.86 percent at 216.00 rupees), Hatton National Bank (up 1.52 percent at 399.75 rupees), Asiri Hospital Holdings (up 12.86 percent at 31.60 rupees), Tokyo Cement Company (up 5.22 percent at 84.70 rupees), and Access Engineering (up 3.93 percent at 81.90 rupees).

Carson Cumberbatch (down 4.24 percent at 712.00 rupees), Richard Pieris and Company (down 2.43 percent at 28.10 rupees), LOLC Holdings (down 0.62 percent at 400.00 rupees), Renuka Holdings (down 2.63 percent at 37.00 rupees), and Chevron Lubricants Lanka (down 0.61 percent at 204.25 rupees) were top negative contributors.

Market turnover was 3.33 billion rupees. The S&P/CSE Banks Industry Group led turnover with 667.76 million rupees.

The session saw heavy crossings, according to Raynal Wickremeratne, Head of Research and Strategy at NDB Securities. Significant crossings included Keells (23 million rupees), Distilleries Company (27.7 million rupees), Sunshine Holdings (30.6 million rupees), Commercial Bank (32.4 million rupees), Ceylon Tobacco Company (35.6 million rupees), Hatton National Bank (39.5 million rupees), Prime Lands (40.5 million rupees), and HAS Holdings (41.5 million rupees).

In corporate news, Hayleys Retail Holdings Ltd announced it has partnered with supply chain software provider Blue Yonder to build and scale an AI-native grocery supermarket chain across Sri Lanka. (Colombo/Nov09/2026)

 

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Sri Lanka’s Hayleys Retail to launch supermarket chain with Blue Yonder

ECONOMYNEXT — Hayleys Retail Holdings Ltd has selected supply chain software provider Blue Yonder to build its grocery retail operations from the ground up, the two companies said in a joint statement.

Hayleys Retail, a member of Sri Lanka’s diversified conglomerate Hayleys Group, plans to open several stores in the near future to serve consumers across the country. The agreement marks Blue Yonder’s first retail customer in Sri Lanka.

“Our entry into supermarket retail is about bringing that same commitment to quality and reliability closer to everyday Sri Lankan consumers,” Mohan Pandithage, Chairman and Chief Executive of Hayleys PLC said.

“With Blue Yonder, our teams will have AI-driven insight to deliver a seamless, consistent shopping experience across every store,” he said.

Hayleys, which accounts for approximately 5 percent of Sri Lanka’s export income and operates across 17 business sectors, is entering the large-scale supermarket space by drawing on its group strengths in manufacturing, logistics, and services.

The company selected Blue Yonder to connect its data across merchandising and shelf space, deploy artificial intelligence agents to catch operational issues early, and scale its business into a national network without changing platforms.

The rollout will begin with merchandise operations to manage suppliers, items, costs, and pricing, followed by machine learning capabilities to forecast demand and balance store inventory during seasonal peaks.

“Hayleys Retail is choosing one where AI is the foundation rather than an add-on—connected data and agentic AI built into core merchandising operations, and planning that learns as the business grows,” Antonio Boccalandro, President, APAC at Blue Yonder said.

The retailer plans to use the platform to automate routine store tasks and adjust inventory according to real-time sales and local market trends as its store footprint grows. (Colombo/Nov09/2026)

 

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Sri Lanka’s Citrus Leisure extends Lotus Tower management pact

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka listed hospitality firm Citrus Leisure said it has extended an agreement to manage consumer-facing and entertainment spaces at the Colombo Lotus Tower, which includes revolving restaurant Blue Orbit, until June next year.

The initial agreement signed between Citrus Leisure and Colombo Lotus Tower Management Company (Private) Limited (CLTMC) is due to expire on December 11.

“The Board of Directors of CLTMC at meeting held on 2nd November 2026 has resolved to extend the term of the Management Agreement and continue the existing Management Agreement until 30th June 2027, to which the company has given its concurrence,” the company said in a market filing.

Citrus Leisure Plc opened its revolving restaurant at the Lotus Tower in December 2023.

The company signed a 3-year agreement with CLTMC in May 2023 to provide services in the management of (l) the banquet hall 1 on the 25th floor, (2) the banquet hall 2 on the 26th floor, (3) the revolving restaurant on the 27th floor, (4) the 6 suites situated on the 28th floor and the kitchen in the basement floor of the Colombo Lotus Tower.

The 350-meter or 1,150-feet tower, the tallest in South Asia, was built at a cost 104.3 million US dollars with 80 percent of the money borrowed from Exim Bank of China.

Located in the commercial heart of Colombo, the tower has been called a symbolic landmark of Sri Lanka as well as a colossal white elephant and has been mired in controversy for years. (Colombo/Nov9/2026)

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CIC Holdings Sept quarter net profit rises 20-pct to Rs1.7bn

ECONOMYNEXT — Sri Lanka conglomerate CIC Holdings recorded a net profit of 1.66 billion rupees for the quarter ended September 30, rising 20.3 percent from 1.38 billion rupees in the same quarter last year, interim accounts showed.

The group posted basic earnings per share of 0.87 rupees for the September quarter, up from 0.73 rupees a year earlier.

Quarterly revenue grew 3.4 percent to 20.89 billion rupees from 20.20 billion rupees, supported by broad-based growth across industrial solutions, livestock, and healthcare segments, which counterbalanced relative demand moderation in agricultural inputs.

Cost of sales rose 5.3 percent to 15.20 billion rupees, outpacing revenue growth and causing gross profit to contract marginally by 1.2 percent to 5.68 billion rupees.

Results from operating activities dropped 7.3 percent to 2.66 billion rupees from 2.87 billion rupees, impacted by higher operating overheads.

Selling expenses expanded 6.8 percent to 2.15 billion rupees, and general and administrative expenses climbed 5.8 percent to 1.07 billion rupees, while other operating income dropped 29.6 percent to 117.40 million rupees.

However, operating profits were cushioned by an impairment reversal on trade receivables of 85.83 million rupees, turning around from an impairment provision of 23.38 million rupees in the corresponding quarter last year.

Net finance costs climbed 35.4 percent to 712.25 million rupees from 526.01 million rupees.

The increase was driven by a 30.8 percent rise in finance expenses to 771.46 million rupees, primarily reflecting higher interest expenses on loans to finance elevated working capital and inventory requirements.

The quarter’s bottom line was strongly bolstered by CIC’s equity-accounted investment in John Keells Holdings PLC (JKH).

Share of profit from equity-accounted investees surged more than fourfold to 590.50 million rupees from 257.87 million rupees, driven by JKH’s strong profit expansion during the period.

The group also recognized a gain on bargain purchase of 55.59 million rupees during the quarter resulting from additional share purchases in JKH where the proportionate net asset value exceeded acquisition cost, compared to no such gain a year earlier.

With associate income gains offsetting operating margin contraction and higher borrowing costs, group pre-tax profit held virtually flat at 2.59 billion rupees, down 0.11 percent.

Income tax expense fell 29.4 percent to 606.24 million rupees from 858.71 million rupees, driving total group profit for the period up 14.1 percent to 1.98 billion rupees.

Total group assets stood at 108.58 billion rupees as of September 30, up from 99.75 billion rupees at the end of March 2026.

Group net asset value per share increased to 25.52 rupees from 22.10 rupees a year earlier.

CIC Holdings’ ordinary voting shares closed at 27.80 rupees at the end of September.(Colombo/Nov09/2026)

 

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