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Monday November 9th, 2026

Rajapaksa era culture and ethos, EPF scams helped Sri Lanka bond frauds: Commission

ECONOMYNEXT – The politicization of Sri Lanka’s central bank , the "corporate culture and ethos" coming from the Rajapaksa regime and ignoring stock scams at the Employees Provident Fund helped bond frauds to be committed from 2015, a Presidential Commission of Inquiry has observed.

The commission inquired into a series of rigged bond auctions during the tenor of Central Bank Governor Arjuna Mahendran, where he was found to have interfered in auctions and policy rates while officials ‘supinely’ stood by.

Perpetual Treasuries, a company connected to his son-in-law Arjun Aloysius made a killing by buying bonds at low prices at auctions using insider information and dumping them at high prices on the central-bank-managed Employees Provident Fund by paying off front office dealers.

But culture of tolerance of irregularities prior to 2015 had allowed the scams to proceed, the commission said.

Politicization

It was public knowledge that Nivard Cabraal who was Governor of the Central Bank from 2006 to January 2015 was a close a "close associate of and was seen to have been politically aligned to the Executive and Government," the commission noted.

"It has often been stated in the public domain, that this led to a certain degree of ‘politicization’ of the actions of the then Governor and the operations of the CBSL during this period,.

The resignation of Governor Cabraal and two appointed members, Nimal Welgama and Neil Umagiliya, as soon as the elections results of January 2008 was known was an indication of the extent to which the Governor and Monetary Board was politicized, commission said.

Though the Governor and member of the board are appointed for six year terms and removal is for specific reasons, under Sri Lanka’s central bank law.

"The fact that Mr. Cabraal, Mr. Welgama and Mr. Umagiliya considered it necessary to resign as soon as a new President was elected and the President who appointed them ceased to be President, suggests that, these three gentlemen regarded themselves to be political appointees who held office at the will of the President," the commission noted.

"A situation where a Governor or members of the Monetary Board or high officials of the CBSL demonstrate that they are unduly `politicized’ or even create perception to that effect is very likely to gravely prejudice the CBSL and its ability to perform its statutory duties.

"Further, a situation where a Governor or members of the Monetary Board or high officials of the CBSL demonstrate that they are unduly ‘politicized’ or are perceived as being so, is likely to influence the senior staff of the CBSL to follow suit and, also, to be readily amenable to the instructions of the Governor or members of the Monetary Board or high officials of the CBSL, irrespective of the propriety or good sense of such instructions.

"It appears to us that, these attitudes are likely to have held sway in the corporate culture and ethos which prevailed in the CBSL at the beginning of 2015."

President Maithripala Sirisena said the Governor and members of the monetary board should be appointed by a constitutional council.

Cabraal and monetary board officials had been in office for eight years before the bondscams and two Deputy Governors for three years, the commission said.

When the Monetary Board made decision on May 2013 to appoint Perpetual Treasuries as a primary dealer, it had not considered whether there was a conflict of interest involving Siromi Wickramasinghe, sister of Cabraal, who was a director of its holding company.

"It is also relevant to note that, Perpetual Asset Management (Pvt) Ltd, which, at that time, was the immediate Holding Company of Perpetual Treasuries Ltd, had made substantial investments in the "Renuka Group of Companies" in which Mr. Nivard Cabraal had close family connections.

Blind Eye

There was also an "undue reverence" for the position of Governor, over a long period of time where an incumbent Governor was "elevated to a position of unquestioned authority."

There have been cases of Deputy Governors being removed for questioning the authority of the Governor, retired Deputy Governor W A Wijewardene had told the commission.

"We also note that, the evidence placed before us suggests that, several aspects of the actions and operations of the CBSL during the period prior to February 2015 reflect that, there was a degree of laxity in the level of supervision over the day-to-day operations in some areas of the CBSL or even, perhaps, a willingness, on the part of high officials to close a blind eye to some aspects of the operation of the the CBSL during that period.

"The evidence placed before us also suggests that, some decisions and acts of the CBSL during the period prior to February 2015, raise questions with regard to the propriety and prudence of those decision and acts."

"It is likely that, these circumstances, influenced the manner in which the senior staff of the CBSL approached the performance of their duties and may have fostered a sense of laxity in the levels of supervision exercised by senior staff and, perhaps, a degree of tolerance in instance where it was apparent that specified Procedures had been disregarded in the day to day operations in some areas of the CBSL."

EPF scams

It was public knowledge that stocks were being "pumped and dumped" on the EPF by some investors including the Perpetual Group.

The commission noted that Indika Saman Kumara and Udayaseelan, dealers at the EPF who bought bonds from Perpetual Treasuries worked in the Fund Management Division of the EPF during 2010-2012 when "some companies the Perpetual Group of Companies figured" in some of the deals.

In evidence before the commission, the Chief Dealer of Perpetual Treasuries testified under oath that "monetary inducements" were made to Saman Kumara from 2014, who the commission noted had acquired wealth beyond his 200,000 rupee salary.

The 2011 stock market scams had also led to Indrani Sugathadasa, a respected civil servant who was the Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission to resign to ‘uphold her principles’, the commission noted.

But no action had been taken by the central bank to probe the EPF deals.

Perpetual Treasuries in their application to become a primary dealer in 2013 had said that it will apply the same techniques learned in the stock market to the bond market.

"Lack of a developed secondary market for government securities also one of he concern (sic) of Public debt department Perpetual Treasuries will promote secondary market transaction using different technique(sic), which its learn (sic) from the equity secondary market transaction (sic).”.

There was not even a voice logging system at the front office of the EPF. Conversation with Saman Kumara and others played at the commission came from banks and dealers.

"It is pertinent to observe here that, there is evidence before us which suggests that, Perpetual Treasuries engaged in ‘market manipulation’ and as Dr W A Wijewardne put it ‘pumping and dumping’ in the secondary market in Treasury bonds," the commission observed.

"A question arises as to whether this was one of the “different technique, which its learn from the equity secondary market transaction,” (sic) which Perpetual Treasuries Ltd, perhaps unwittingly, mentioned when it made an application to obtain a Primary Dealers license.

"The fact that, CBSL took no action despite these circumstances, had to have an adverse effect on the manner in which the senior staff of the CBSL approached their duties," the commission noted.

Before 2015, there irregularities were found in direct placements where bonds were sold to primary dealers outside the 05 basis points difference from market price.

The monetary board had approved the bonds to be sold only to ‘captive sources’ (state funds), but they had also been sold to primary dealers.

Wrong Message

A decision to buy ‘Greek Bonds’ which tanked causing a 15.6 million dollar loss was also taken at an ‘informal meeting’ or ‘gathering’ off senior officials which was approved by Governor Cabraal but not approved by the monetary board, the commission noted.

It indicated "the existence of a culture within the CBSL which vested in the Governor and some high officials, the power to take very significant decisions without necessarily adhering to proper Procedures, which require first carrying out a careful and prudent assessment of all the relevant facts, policies and long term consequences which such decisions may have," the commission said.

The Central bank also did not have a ‘Regulatory Compliance Department’ or a ‘Risk Management Department," which even large companies now consider them essential now.

That the central bank did not consider it necessary to operate such units may given the message to senior officials that regulatory compliance and risk management was not a high priority.

"The pliant and acquiescent attitudes adopted by the senior staff of the CBSL in the course of the events of 27th February 2015 – which took place just over a month after Mr. Mahendran assumed office as the Governor of the CBSL and, therefore, in the background of the corporate culture and ethos he inherited – tellingly demonstrate the manner in which senior staff of the CBSL approached their duties, at that time," the commission said.

Supine Negligence

The commission Deputy Governor (P) Samarasiri who chaired Tender Board in February 2015, which had recommended the acceptance of 2.0 billion rupees of 30 year bonds had "supinely acted in compliance" with a directive by Governor Mahendran to accept 10 billion rupees of bonds, most of it made by Perpetual.

There was gross breach of duty.

"…Deputy Governor Samarasiri who, as the Chairman of the Tender Board, had a duty to ensure that the Tender Board reached an independent and considered decision, acted in gross breach of this duty and supinely obeyed the instructions given by Mr. Mahendran," the commission said.

"We are of the view that, the aforesaid conduct on the part of Deputy Governor Samarasiri amounts to gross negligence and a grave breach of his duties and responsibilities as the Chairman of the Tender Board and a Deputy Governor of the CBSL."

The commission also said Deputy Governors (Ananda) Silva and (N) Weerasinghe were negligent and failed to fulfil their responsibilities as Deputy Governors by remaining silent" when they heard the direction issued by Mahendran to suspend or stop Direct Placements suddenly. (Colombo/Jan18/2018)

 

Sri Lanka’s flash floods in capital point to systemic institutional failure, ignored directives

ECONOMYNEXT – As torrential monsoon downpours transformed Sri Lanka’s commercial capital’s thoroughfares into raging brown rivers on Friday (06) submerging vehicles, paralyzing public transit, and inundating critical facilities like the National Hospital, the crisis was framed by authorities as an act of nature.

But for the millions of residents wading through waist-deep water, the disaster was not merely meteorological. It was man-made, preventable, and a glaring testament to gross institutional negligence.

Vraîe Cally Balthazaar, the Mayor of the island nation’s biggest local governing body Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) posted on her FaceBook (Meta) platform just a week ago before the floods that people in her ward “have had to live with the risk of flooding for years” after the stormwater drain running through the Jawatta Public Cemetery collapsed in 2019.

She said in the post that she promised the residents that the CMC would get the repairs done before the end of September, and she was happy to say that the CMC has “managed to complete the work by September 15.

“And sometimes, something as simple as fixing a drain can make a real difference to an entire neighbourhood,” Balthazaar said.

However, the flash floods saw the same area heavily flooded despite the ‘fixing’ by the CMC.

Just 24 days before the floods, Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya herself issued a direct, unequivocal order to government officials and municipal authorities to treat the cleaning of Colombo’s canal and drainage systems as an exceptional priority.

She directed to expedite the work and complete it within two weeks to ensure proper rainwater management amid anticipated increases in rainfall.

Prime Minister Amarasuriya issued these directives while addressing the Colombo District Coordinating Committee meeting held on October 13 at the Narahenpita District Secretariat.

During the meeting, officials from divisional secretariat offices, the Agrarian Development Department, and the Provincial Irrigation Department highlighted existing challenges in cleaning drainage and canal systems, noting issues such as a shortage of technical officers and difficulties faced in formulating plans and estimates.

Her instruction came in response to early meteorological indicators pointing toward an intensifying inter-monsoonal rainfall season.

But the floods last week proved that these directives had been ignored, delayed, and left unimplemented by the very bodies sworn to protect the city’s populace.

Recognizing the chronic vulnerability of the commercial capital’s low-lying geography, the Prime Minister instructed relevant stakeholders to systematically clear Colombo’s primary canals, secondary outlets, and subterranean drainage systems.

Crucially, the directive came with a strict deadline: a two-week window to complete the comprehensive clearing of blockages, silt, and solid waste that choke the city’s waterways.

Colombo would not have had last week’s floods, had the Prime Minister’s instruction been heeded and executed.

But the Prime Minister’s instruction designed precisely to preempt the catastrophic urban flooding that has chronically plagued Colombo during heavy weather was ignored.

Yet, when the skies opened up last Friday (06), the two-week deadline had long expired into the ether of bureaucratic inaction.

The canals remained congested with plastic debris, unauthorized construction bottlenecks, and thick layers of silt.

The drainage systems, starved of maintenance, failed instantly.

Neither the central government machinery nor the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) can wash their hands of accountability.

The ‘Clean Sri Lanka’ programme under the current government has been created to deal with prevention of flooding among many other ambitious goals.

“The responsibility for this damage must be borne by the President even more than the Mayor,” former Urban Development and Megapolis Minister Champika Ranawaka, a strong government critic, said on his YouTube platform.

“He is the head of the disaster management apparatus, and ‘Clean Sri Lanka’ operates under his direct leadership. Because of his actions and their administrative conduct, the entire state machinery has been brought to a standstill.”

Anatomy of Municipal Paralysis

When orders from the higher office like Prime Minister of the state can be casually sidelined by municipal inertia, it exposes a profound fracture in governance, one where public safety is compromised by institutional paralysis.

At the heart of Colombo’s drainage crisis is a systemic failure of local governance and inter-agency coordination.

The Colombo Municipal Council, tasked with the day-to-day stewardship of municipal infrastructure, waste management, and local drainage networks, has long operated in an administrative comfort zone characterized by reactive posturing rather than proactive mitigation.

When the Prime Minister’s directive was issued in mid-October, it should have triggered an immediate emergency mobilization.

Municipal work crews, heavy machinery, and desilting operations ought to have been deployed across every vulnerable ward, from the commercial hubs of Fort and Pettah to densely populated residential quarters like Borella, Wellawatte, and Grandpass.

Instead, citizens witnessed what can only be described as administrative inertia.

Bureaucratic red tape, sluggish procurement of maintenance contracts, and a lack of accountability mechanisms meant that instructions from the Prime Minister trickled down into endless committee meetings rather than field operations.

By treating a critical pre-monsoon cleanup as a routine administrative task rather than an urgent, life-saving imperative, municipal officials displayed a reckless disregard for urban risk management.

The government repeatedly said it has collected ample tax revenue to run the country. But that money could not be used urgently to protect the Colombo city when it was evident what was going to happen as per Prime Minister Amarasuriya’s instructions.

Furthermore, the failure extends beyond mere delayed cleanups to encompass chronic structural enforcement failures.

Over decades, Colombo’s natural hydrological buffers including its wetlands, marshes, and secondary flood retention areas have been systematically degraded or encroached upon by uncoordinated commercial and residential developments.

When drainage systems are clogged with garbage while vital retention pathways are blocked by concrete, even a standard heavy downpour is bound to trigger catastrophe.

Friday’s deluge merely exposed the cumulative cost of this willful administrative blindness.

Economic Toll of Negligence

The consequences of this systemic failure were borne immediately by ordinary citizens and critical public infrastructure.

The inundation of the National Hospital of Sri Lanka, where floodwaters unprecedentedly breached critical service areas, should be considered a national scandal.

That a premier healthcare institution can be crippled within 2 hours of heavy rain, jeopardizing patient care and compromising sterile environments, illustrates the deadly stakes of municipal failure.

Beyond the hospitals, small business owners watched their livelihoods float away, commuters were stranded for hours in gridlocked, submerged buses, and low-income families residing in underserved settlements suffered extensive property damage.

For an urban economy trying to anchor Sri Lanka’s fragile post-crisis recovery, recurring paralyzing floods exact a heavy toll in lost productivity, infrastructure damage, and emergency response costs.

Accountability

The CMC and government have pointed fingers at the illegal structures erected under past governments for the latest disaster. But this government has already been in power for two years.

In the aftermath of the disaster, routine finger-pointing between central agencies and municipal bodies also has begun, with officials attempting to deflect blame onto unprecedented rainfall volumes.

But meteorological data offers no refuge for negligent administrators.

The rainfall, while heavy, was seasonally anticipated; indeed, it was precisely why the Prime Minister issued her October directive.

When a directive issued by the second-in-command of the country is left gathering dust on a municipal desk while citizens face preventable devastation, the social contract breaks down.

The current government and the Colombo Municipal Council cannot hide behind excuses of resource constraints or administrative oversight.

Preventing flash floods requires more than issuing seasonal press releases or convening post-disaster committees after the water has receded.

It demands rigorous enforcement, transparent institutional accountability, and a zero-tolerance approach to administrative lethargy.

If the authorities cannot execute basic drainage maintenance, Colombo will remain structurally vulnerable, hostage to the next raincloud, and failed by the very institutions meant to protect it. (Colombo/November 08/2026)

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Sri Lanka rupee closes at 332.53/59 to US dollar spot, bond yields edge up

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka’s rupee closed at 332.53/59 to the US dollar spot on Monday, from 332.55/60 the previous day, while bond yields closed higher, dealers said.

A bond maturing on 15.09.2029 closed at 190/98 percent, up from 10.85/95 percent.

A bond maturing on 01.08.2030 closed at 11.07/12 percent, up from 11.05/10 percent.

A bond maturing on 01.02.2031 closed at 11.30/40 percent, up from 11.10/15 percent.

A bond maturing on 15.12.2032 closed at 11.65/70 percent, up from 11.55/65 percent.

A bond maturing on 01.11.2033 closed at 11.95/12.00 percent, up from 11.90/95 percent.

A bond maturing on 15.10.2034 closed at 12.10/15 percent, up from 12.05/12 percent.

A bond maturing on 15.08.2036 closed at 12.40/50 percent, up from 12.30/40 percent. (Colombo/Nov9/2026)

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Sri Lanka stocks close up 1.37-pct, banks lead turnover

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka’s Colombo Stock Exchange closed up on Monday, CSE data showed, with the benchmark All Share Price Index moving up 1.37 percent.

The ASPI was up 291.72 points at 21,531.37, while the more liquid S&P SL20 was up 1.67 percent, or 100.96 points, at 6,146.34.

Positive contributors to the ASPI were Commercial Bank of Ceylon (up 2.86 percent at 216.00 rupees), Hatton National Bank (up 1.52 percent at 399.75 rupees), Asiri Hospital Holdings (up 12.86 percent at 31.60 rupees), Tokyo Cement Company (up 5.22 percent at 84.70 rupees), and Access Engineering (up 3.93 percent at 81.90 rupees).

Carson Cumberbatch (down 4.24 percent at 712.00 rupees), Richard Pieris and Company (down 2.43 percent at 28.10 rupees), LOLC Holdings (down 0.62 percent at 400.00 rupees), Renuka Holdings (down 2.63 percent at 37.00 rupees), and Chevron Lubricants Lanka (down 0.61 percent at 204.25 rupees) were top negative contributors.

Market turnover was 3.33 billion rupees. The S&P/CSE Banks Industry Group led turnover with 667.76 million rupees.

The session saw heavy crossings, according to Raynal Wickremeratne, Head of Research and Strategy at NDB Securities. Significant crossings included Keells (23 million rupees), Distilleries Company (27.7 million rupees), Sunshine Holdings (30.6 million rupees), Commercial Bank (32.4 million rupees), Ceylon Tobacco Company (35.6 million rupees), Hatton National Bank (39.5 million rupees), Prime Lands (40.5 million rupees), and HAS Holdings (41.5 million rupees).

In corporate news, Hayleys Retail Holdings Ltd announced it has partnered with supply chain software provider Blue Yonder to build and scale an AI-native grocery supermarket chain across Sri Lanka. (Colombo/Nov09/2026)

 

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Sri Lanka’s Hayleys Retail to launch supermarket chain with Blue Yonder

ECONOMYNEXT — Hayleys Retail Holdings Ltd has selected supply chain software provider Blue Yonder to build its grocery retail operations from the ground up, the two companies said in a joint statement.

Hayleys Retail, a member of Sri Lanka’s diversified conglomerate Hayleys Group, plans to open several stores in the near future to serve consumers across the country. The agreement marks Blue Yonder’s first retail customer in Sri Lanka.

“Our entry into supermarket retail is about bringing that same commitment to quality and reliability closer to everyday Sri Lankan consumers,” Mohan Pandithage, Chairman and Chief Executive of Hayleys PLC said.

“With Blue Yonder, our teams will have AI-driven insight to deliver a seamless, consistent shopping experience across every store,” he said.

Hayleys, which accounts for approximately 5 percent of Sri Lanka’s export income and operates across 17 business sectors, is entering the large-scale supermarket space by drawing on its group strengths in manufacturing, logistics, and services.

The company selected Blue Yonder to connect its data across merchandising and shelf space, deploy artificial intelligence agents to catch operational issues early, and scale its business into a national network without changing platforms.

The rollout will begin with merchandise operations to manage suppliers, items, costs, and pricing, followed by machine learning capabilities to forecast demand and balance store inventory during seasonal peaks.

“Hayleys Retail is choosing one where AI is the foundation rather than an add-on—connected data and agentic AI built into core merchandising operations, and planning that learns as the business grows,” Antonio Boccalandro, President, APAC at Blue Yonder said.

The retailer plans to use the platform to automate routine store tasks and adjust inventory according to real-time sales and local market trends as its store footprint grows. (Colombo/Nov09/2026)

 

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Sri Lanka’s Citrus Leisure extends Lotus Tower management pact

ECONOMYNEXT – Sri Lanka listed hospitality firm Citrus Leisure said it has extended an agreement to manage consumer-facing and entertainment spaces at the Colombo Lotus Tower, which includes revolving restaurant Blue Orbit, until June next year.

The initial agreement signed between Citrus Leisure and Colombo Lotus Tower Management Company (Private) Limited (CLTMC) is due to expire on December 11.

“The Board of Directors of CLTMC at meeting held on 2nd November 2026 has resolved to extend the term of the Management Agreement and continue the existing Management Agreement until 30th June 2027, to which the company has given its concurrence,” the company said in a market filing.

Citrus Leisure Plc opened its revolving restaurant at the Lotus Tower in December 2023.

The company signed a 3-year agreement with CLTMC in May 2023 to provide services in the management of (l) the banquet hall 1 on the 25th floor, (2) the banquet hall 2 on the 26th floor, (3) the revolving restaurant on the 27th floor, (4) the 6 suites situated on the 28th floor and the kitchen in the basement floor of the Colombo Lotus Tower.

The 350-meter or 1,150-feet tower, the tallest in South Asia, was built at a cost 104.3 million US dollars with 80 percent of the money borrowed from Exim Bank of China.

Located in the commercial heart of Colombo, the tower has been called a symbolic landmark of Sri Lanka as well as a colossal white elephant and has been mired in controversy for years. (Colombo/Nov9/2026)

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CIC Holdings Sept quarter net profit rises 20-pct to Rs1.7bn

ECONOMYNEXT — Sri Lanka conglomerate CIC Holdings recorded a net profit of 1.66 billion rupees for the quarter ended September 30, rising 20.3 percent from 1.38 billion rupees in the same quarter last year, interim accounts showed.

The group posted basic earnings per share of 0.87 rupees for the September quarter, up from 0.73 rupees a year earlier.

Quarterly revenue grew 3.4 percent to 20.89 billion rupees from 20.20 billion rupees, supported by broad-based growth across industrial solutions, livestock, and healthcare segments, which counterbalanced relative demand moderation in agricultural inputs.

Cost of sales rose 5.3 percent to 15.20 billion rupees, outpacing revenue growth and causing gross profit to contract marginally by 1.2 percent to 5.68 billion rupees.

Results from operating activities dropped 7.3 percent to 2.66 billion rupees from 2.87 billion rupees, impacted by higher operating overheads.

Selling expenses expanded 6.8 percent to 2.15 billion rupees, and general and administrative expenses climbed 5.8 percent to 1.07 billion rupees, while other operating income dropped 29.6 percent to 117.40 million rupees.

However, operating profits were cushioned by an impairment reversal on trade receivables of 85.83 million rupees, turning around from an impairment provision of 23.38 million rupees in the corresponding quarter last year.

Net finance costs climbed 35.4 percent to 712.25 million rupees from 526.01 million rupees.

The increase was driven by a 30.8 percent rise in finance expenses to 771.46 million rupees, primarily reflecting higher interest expenses on loans to finance elevated working capital and inventory requirements.

The quarter’s bottom line was strongly bolstered by CIC’s equity-accounted investment in John Keells Holdings PLC (JKH).

Share of profit from equity-accounted investees surged more than fourfold to 590.50 million rupees from 257.87 million rupees, driven by JKH’s strong profit expansion during the period.

The group also recognized a gain on bargain purchase of 55.59 million rupees during the quarter resulting from additional share purchases in JKH where the proportionate net asset value exceeded acquisition cost, compared to no such gain a year earlier.

With associate income gains offsetting operating margin contraction and higher borrowing costs, group pre-tax profit held virtually flat at 2.59 billion rupees, down 0.11 percent.

Income tax expense fell 29.4 percent to 606.24 million rupees from 858.71 million rupees, driving total group profit for the period up 14.1 percent to 1.98 billion rupees.

Total group assets stood at 108.58 billion rupees as of September 30, up from 99.75 billion rupees at the end of March 2026.

Group net asset value per share increased to 25.52 rupees from 22.10 rupees a year earlier.

CIC Holdings’ ordinary voting shares closed at 27.80 rupees at the end of September.(Colombo/Nov09/2026)

 

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